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We study constructions of deterministic extractors for various specialized classes
of sources. Deterministic extractors for a class of sources are functions such that for
any random source in the class, the output of the extractor is close to uniform. Thus,
we can transform weak randomness into true randomness that can be used in appli-
cations. For example, the true randomness we extract can be used in cryptographic
protocols, such as generating cryptographic keys. Other applications include dis-
tributed computing and randomized algorithms. We have examined some of the
most general and interesting classes of sources for which we can construct such ex-
tractors. For each class, our goal is to construct extractors with exponentially small
error that extract as much of the min-entropy in the source as possible and that work
vii
even when the min-entropy in the source is small.
In particular, we construct extractors for sources that only have access to
a small amount of space. This construction is based on a construction for inde-
pendent sources, which are sources consisting of a number of independent smaller
sources. We also give results for oblivious bit-fixing and symbol-fixing sources. In
such sources some of the bits (or symbols) are fixed and then the rest are chosen
uniformly at random. These results also have an application in the area of exposure-
resilient cryptography, giving adaptive All-Or-Nothing-Transforms. We also have
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True randomness is needed for many applications. For example, randomness is
needed in cryptographic protocols, distributed computing, and randomized algo-
rithms. Yet most physical sources of randomness are not truly random, and some
are quite weak in that they can have substantial biases and correlations. Weak ran-
dom sources can also arise in cryptography when an adversary learns some partial
information about a random string. A natural approach to dealing with weak ran-
dom sources is to apply a randomness extractor — a function that transforms a
weak random source into an almost-perfect random source.
Perhaps the first and most well known example of a randomness extractor
was due to von Neumann [vN51]. His extractor extracts randomness from a se-
quence of tosses of a coin with unknown bias. It works by pairing the bits given by
the coin and outputting 1 if they are 01 and 0 if they are 10. Otherwise, on 00 and
11 it doesn’t output anything. In this way it is able to extract completely unbiased
bits. This extractor has also seen practical application, as Intel’s random number
generator [JK99] uses it as one of its components.
With von Neumann’s early work as inspiration, there was a significant body
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of work in the 80’s focused on this problem of randomness extraction, with re-
searchers considering richer and richer models of weak sources, e.g. [Blu86, SV86,
CG88, Vaz87, CFG+85, BBR88, BOL90, LLS89]. However, attempts to handle
sources that do not have a significant amount of independence ran into strong im-
possibility results showing that it is impossible to devise a single function that ex-
tracts even one bit of randomness from sufficiently general classes of sources [SV86].
These impossibility results led researchers to focus on the weaker task of
simulating probabilistic algorithms with weak random sources [VV85, CG88, Vaz86,
CW89, Zuc96]. This line of work culminated in the introduction, by Nisan and
Zuckerman [NZ96], of the notion of a seeded randomness extractor, which uses
a small number of additional truly random bits, known as the seed, as a catalyst
for the randomness extraction. Using a random seed seems at first to be cheating,
since if we had access to true randomness we wouldn’t need an extractor in the first
place. However, for the particular application of simulating probabilistic algorithms
we can enumerate over all possible seeds, then combine the results (by taking the
majority, for example) to get the answer. If the seed length is logarithmic (which
many constructions give), then the algorithm is still polynomial time. Seeded ran-
domness extractors have turned out to have a wide variety of other applications and
were found to be closely related to many other important pseudorandom objects.
Thus, they were the main focus of attention in the area of randomness extraction
in the 90’s, with a variety of very efficient constructions. (See [NTS99, Sha02] for
surveys.)
However, in some applications where we need randomness, such as in many
cryptographic protocols, we can’t enumerate over all of the seeds of a seeded ex-
tractor and so we really do need a way to directly generate randomness from weak
random sources. For example, in key generation we need to randomly generate a
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single cryptographic key, and so being able to enumerate over all possible keys gen-
erated by the seeded extractor doesn’t help. Since we can’t have “seedless”, a.k.a.
deterministic extractors for general weak sources, the question then becomes what
types of more restricted classes of sources we can extract from deterministically.
After being mostly abandoned in favor of seeded extractors, interest in this ques-
tion was renewed in recent years by the works of Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00] and
Dodis [Dod00a]. In this thesis, we continue this investigation into constructing de-
terministic extractors for various classes of sources. We also examine applications
of deterministic extractors. For example, seedless extractors for specific classes of
sources were found to be useful in mitigating partial key exposure in cryptogra-
phy [CDH+00, Dod00b].
Before proceeding, we recall a few standard definitions: the min-entropy k of
a source X is defined as H∞(X) = mins(log(1/Pr[X = s])). (Here and throughout,
all logarithms are base 2 unless otherwise specified.) We use min-entropy rather
than the usual Shannon entropy because min-entropy better represents the worst
case entropy of a single sample from the source, which is what we need for extrac-
tion. The min-entropy rate δ for a source on {0,1}n is defined as δ = H∞(X)/n, so
it is the fraction of the total possible min-entropy that is present in the source. The
variation distance between random variables X1 and X2 on Ω is defined as
|X1−X2|= max
S⊆Ω
|Pr[X1 ∈ S]−Pr[X2 ∈ S]|=
1
2 ∑s∈Ω
|Pr[X1 = s]−Pr[X2 = s]|.
The following definition, taken from [Dod00a] and generalizing definitions
from [TV00], formalizes our notion of a deterministic extractor.
Definition 1.0.1. A function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m is an ε-extractor for a set X




Before looking for any explicit constructions, a natural question to ask is whether
deterministic extractors for a given class of sources X even exist. In particular, we
consider the general case where all we know is that each source in the class X has
min-entropy at least k. Since for all of the classes of sources we consider we have a
lower bound on the min-entropy, this general case encompasses all of these classes.
This will allow us to compare our explicit constructions with our nonconstructive
bounds to see how much better we can hope to make our explicit constructions.
To show that an extractor for a class X exists, we show that any randomly chosen
function is an extractor for X . Using the probabilistic method, it’s not hard to show
that even if the number of sources |X | is exponentially large a random function is
still an extractor with high probability. In fact, we can have |X | = 22αk for any
α < 1. (Note that the set of all random sources with min-entropy k has size about
2n2
k
, which is much larger.) The output length of this function can even be almost
as large as k.
One of the main problems with this approach is that a random function is not
efficiently computable and takes exponentially many random bits to select. How-
ever, Dodis [Dod00a], with an argument based on [TV00], showed that similar re-
sults can be achieved by selecting a random t-wise independent function (for a high
enough t). This construction is efficient and only requires a few random bits. Note
that it’s not necessarily cheating to use randomness to select the function, since we
only require a one time use of randomness in the beginning, and not each and every
time we use the function as in the case of seeded extractors. However, the param-
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eters for the results proved in [Dod00a] are not quite as good as in the results we
prove.
While these nonconstructive results are nice, they still require a one time
investment of randomness and the function we obtain is only an extractor with high
probability. What these results do show is that as long as the number of sources we
wish to extract from is not too large, constructing deterministic extractors is poten-
tially feasible. This motivates our interest in looking for natural classes of sources
for which we might be able to construct explicit deterministic extractors. We wish
to find the most natural, useful, and general sources for which deterministic extrac-
tion is possible. To do this, we examine many particular classes of sources.
1.2 Overview
In the rest of the introduction we outline in more detail the classes of sources and
applications we examine in this thesis. For each class, we outline what was known
previously and the new results we obtain in this thesis. The first classes we con-
sider are bit-fixing and symbol-fixing sources, which consist of a string of bits or
symbols, some of which are fixed and the rest of which are chosen uniformly at ran-
dom. The results for these classes are based on joint work with David Zuckerman
[KZ06]. We next look at sources consisting of a number of independent smaller
sources. The most general class we consider are sources generated using a small
amount of space. The results for these two classes are based on joint work with
Anup Rao, Salil Vadhan, and David Zuckerman [KRVZ06]. Finally, we look at
sources uniformly distributed over affine subspaces of {0,1}n.
For all of the classes of sources, we will look at tradeoffs between the various
parameters in the extractor. We will usually think of the length of the source as be-
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ing fixed, and attempt to optimize the error, the output length, and the min-entropy
of the sources for which our extractors work. Since when extracting randomness we
want the output to be very close to uniform, it is most useful to have error exponen-
tially small in the output length. Since it’s impossible to have a higher output length
than the min-entropy, our primary goal is to construct extractors with exponentially
small error which have output length as close as possible to the min-entropy of the
source. The primary issue that comes up is that frequently our constructions only
work when the min-entropy is at least a certain threshold. There is often a trade-
off among various constructions between the min-entropy threshold and the output
length. Some constructions work for smaller min-entropies but extract fewer bits.
Ideally we want extractors which extract a near optimal number of bits which work
even for min-entropies that are logarithmic in the length of the source.
1.3 Oblivious Bit-Fixing and Symbol-Fixing Sources
The first sources we consider are bit-fixing sources, in which some subset of the bits
are fixed and the rest are chosen at random. We start with these sources because
they are the simplest class of sources that we study, yet they also have interesting
applications. There are two classes of bit-fixing sources, depending on whether
the fixed bits are chosen before or after the random bits are determined, known




In oblivious bit-fixing sources, the fixed bits are chosen first and then the rest are
chosen randomly [CFG+85, CW89]. Such sources arise in the context of producing
random bits from random coins in a distributed environment, where some of the
processors produce faulty coins (not dependent on the good coins). Clearly we can
extract one uniform bit by taking the parity of the input bits. However, to extract
even two perfectly uniform bits Chor et al. [CFG+85] showed that at least 1/3 of
the bits need to be random. Friedman generalized this result to obtain bounds on
the number of random bits needed for longer outputs [Fri92]. However, since we
allow some error in our extractor, these bounds don’t apply. Despite this, the best
previous constructions for extracting many bits still required that at least half of the
bits be random [KJS01, BS00].
1.3.2 Our Results
In this thesis, we improve upon the previous results by showing how to extract
Ω(k2/n) bits from any n bit long oblivious bit-fixing source with min-entropy k >
√
n and Ω(logk) bits for any k. In both cases we have exponentially small error.
We also introduce a variant on oblivious bit-fixing sources known as obliv-
ious symbol-fixing sources. In d-ary oblivious symbol-fixing sources, instead of
bits we have a string of symbols from a d-symbol alphabet. Some of the symbols
are uniformly random while the rest are fixed. This model is somewhat more re-
stricted than the bit-fixing model. For example, for d = 2, this model is the same as
the oblivious bit-fixing model, and for d = 4, it corresponds to oblivious bit-fixing
sources where the fixed and random bits have to come in pairs. However, it is still
an extremely natural and interesting model.
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For symbol-fixing sources with d > 2, we get much better results than for
oblivious bit-fixing sources. We construct an extractor that extracts a constant frac-
tion of the randomness for sources with any number of random symbols, with the
constant depending on d. In particular, as d grows large it extracts almost all of the
randomness.
Subsequent to our work, Gabizon, Raz, and Shaltiel [GRS04] have improved
upon our constructions of extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources. They give two
main extractor constructions. The first construction is able to extract almost all of
the random bits from oblivious bit-fixing sources that have min-entropy k >
√
n,
with exponentially small error. The second construction is able to extract Ω(k) bits
as long as k > logc n for some constant c, with much higher error.
1.3.3 Exposure-Resilient Cryptography
Our extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources also have applications in the area
of exposure-resilient cryptography. In traditional cryptography, secret keys are re-
quired to remain secret. Most cryptographic schemes have no security guarantees
even when an adversary learns only a small part of the secret key. Is it possible
to achieve security even when the adversary learns most of the secret key? The
class of mappings known as All-Or-Nothing Transforms (AONT) address this is-
sue. AONT’s were originally introduced by Rivest [Riv97] to address security con-
cerns arising in the context of block ciphers. An AONT is an efficient randomized
mapping that is easy to invert given the entire output, but where an adversary would
gain “no information” about the input even if it could see almost the entire output
of the AONT. Various important applications of the AONT have been discovered,
such as the previously mentioned application of protecting against almost complete
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exposure of secret keys [CDH+00], and increasing the efficiency of block ciphers
[MPR, JSY99, Bla96].
Boyko used the Random-Oracle model to give the first formalizations and
constructions of the AONT [Boy99]. Canetti et al. gave the first constructions in the
standard computational model [CDH+00]. For their construction, they introduced
a new, related primitive known as an Exposure-Resilient Function (ERF). An ERF
is an efficiently computable deterministic function where the output looks random
even if the adversary obtains almost all of the bits of a randomly chosen input. They
then reduced the task of constructing an AONT to constructing an equivalent ERF.
This work was extended by Dodis et al. [DSS01] to the adaptive setting, where the
adversary can decide which bits to look at based on the bits he has already seen.
This setting is applicable to the problem of partial key exposure, where it is likely
that the adversary would be adaptive.
An important idea used in both [CDH+00] and [DSS01] is that it is possible
to construct ERF’s in the computational setting by first constructing ERF’s in the
statistical setting and then applying a pseudorandom generator to the output. This
allows us to get longer output lengths, which is useful for applications. Because of
this observation, we can restrict our attention to constructing ERF’s in the statistical
setting, where the output must be statistically close to the uniform distribution.
However, though Dodis et al. [DSS01] give a probabilistic construction of adaptive
statistical ERF’s, the problem of giving an explicit construction was left open (see
also [Dod00a]).
We address this problem by giving an explicit construction of efficient adap-
tive ERF’s in the statistical setting, which in turn gives an explicit construction of
adaptive AONT’s. Our construction actually gives a stronger function, known as an
almost-perfect resilient function (APRF), introduced by Kurosawa et al. [KJS01].
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An APRF is like an ERF, except it works for even the case where the adversary can
fix some bits of the input instead of merely looking at them. The connection be-
tween APRF’s and exposure resilient cryptography was shown in [DSS01], where
it was proved that APRF’s are also adaptive ERF’s. In fact, it is easy to see that
APRF’s are essentially the same as deterministic extractors for oblivious bit-fixing
sources. So by constructing extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources, we will also
get APRF’s and thus adaptive statistical ERF’s and AONT’s.
1.4 Non-Oblivious Bit-Fixing Sources
1.4.1 Previous Work
Non-oblivious bit-fixing sources [BOL90, KKL88], unlike the oblivious case, can
have the fixed bits depend on the random bits chosen. The problem of extracting
from such sources was originally studied in the context of collective coin-flipping
[BOL90]. Collective coin-flipping is the problem of producing a random bit from
random coins in a distributed environment, where some of the bits may be adver-
sarially chosen. Here, we consider the case where each player produces a single
bit, and the adversarial bits can depend upon the bits produced by the other players.
This scenario is exactly the same as extraction of a single bit from non-oblivious bit-
fixing sources. For the case of extracting a single bit, nearly optimal lower [KKL88]
and upper [AL93] bounds are known, though the upper bound is not completely
constructive. Because these sources are much more general than in the oblivious
case, we need almost all of the bits in the source to be random in order to extract.
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1.4.2 Our Results
Previously, little attention has been given to generalizing the single bit results to
the case of multiple output bits. We give bounds for this case. We show how
to construct an ε-extractor for the set of length n non-oblivious bit-fixing sources
with n− ` random bits which extracts (ε/`)1/ log3 2n bits. In the other direction, we
show that at most O(nε/`) bits can be extracted from such non-oblivious bit-fixing
sources.
1.5 Total-Entropy Independent Sources
1.5.1 Previous Work
Much work has been done on extracting from a small number of independent
sources. In these sources, we know nothing about the structure of the individual
sources. The only guarantee is that each source has a certain amount of min-
entropy. This model was essentially introduced by Chor and Goldreich [CG88].
The idea of generating randomness using independent sources had previously been
introduced using a somewhat different model by Santha and Vazirani [SV86]. The
initial results of Chor and Goldreich extracted from two independent sources with
min-entropy rate greater than one half. Recently, extractors have been obtained
for multiple independent sources with any constant and even subconstant, poly-
nomially small, min-entropy rate, but each of these require at least 3 independent
sources [BIW04, BKS+05, Raz05, Rao06]. The best extractor for 2 independent
sources requires that the sources have min-entropy at least some constant slightly
less than 1/2 [Bou05]. This model is appealing because the individual sources can
have arbitrary correlations and biases, and it seems plausible that we can ensure
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independence between a few such sources.
We note that the Chor and Goldreich model for extracting from two sources
is actually stronger than the model stated above. Instead of requiring each source
to have a certain min-entropy, they only require a bound on the total min-entropy
over both sources. This requirement is intuitively appealing since it is easier to
guarantee the total min-entropy than the min-entropy for each source, so this model
is much more general than the standard independent source model. The big question
is whether the results for more than two sources can be similarly generalized to a
model where only the total min-entropy is known. This is the case we address.
1.5.2 Our Results
To generalize the independent source model, we introduce the model of total-
entropy independent sources. These are sources consisting of r independent sources
over {0,1}`. The case of independent sources where you only know the total min-
entropy then corresponds to r being small while ` is large. So in this case we’re
viewing each symbol as a long source. For example, when r = 2 we get the sources
studied by Chor and Goldreich [CG88].
This model also encompasses the case where r is large, but ` is small. This
case can be thought of as a generalization of symbol-fixing sources to the case
where instead of each symbol being totally uniformly random or fixed, each symbol
is allowed to be chosen from any probability distribution. For example, when ` = 1,
we get a sequence of independent bits, each of which has a (possibly) different and
unknown bias. In this way, we see that our model not only generalizes the bit-fixing
model, but also generalizes von Neumann’s biased coin model [vN51]. Even for
this relatively simple and natural case, nothing had been known prior to our work.
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All of our results are obtained by generalizing previous techniques for ex-
tracting from independent and symbol-fixing sources. All of these results have
various tradeoffs between the number of symbols r, the length of each source `, and
the total min-entropy k. Generally speaking, which construction is better depends
on whether the total-entropy independent source you wish to extract from looks
more like the independent source model or the symbol-fixing source model.
For total-entropy independent sources that are more like symbol-fixing sources,
we generalize our techniques for extracting from oblivious bit-fixing sources to-
gether with the techniques of Gabizon, Raz, and Shaltiel [GRS04] to get an ex-
tractor which extracts (1− o(1))k bits with exponentially small error as long as
` < 12 logr and the min-entropy rate is at least Õ(1/
√
r`). We can also generalize
our extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources with small min-entropy, together with
techniques from [GRS04], to get an extractor that extracts (1−o(1))k bits from any
total-entropy independent source as long as k ≥ (2` logr)C and `≤ b logk for some
constants C and b. This extractor, however, has only polynomially small error.
If we think of the total-entropy independent sources as being more like in-
dependent sources, we can get other results which generalize independent source
extractors. The first result we get is that we can easily generalize the exponen-
tial sum based independent source extractor of Bourgain et al. [BGK06, Bou05]
to the total-entropy independent source case. Combining this extractor with the
techniques from [GRS04], we get an extractor that extracts any constant fraction
of the min-entropy, say .99k, from any constant min-entropy rate total-entropy in-
dependent source with exponentially small error. Note that in this case, unlike the
previous case, we have no restriction on the source length ` and can have arbitrarily
large sources.
In a more involved construction, we construct an extractor that uses some
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of the ideas from the work of Rao [Rao06] and recent constructions of random-
ness efficient condensers [BKS+05, Raz05], again combined with [GRS04]. It
extracts (1− o(1))k bits with exponentially small error from total-entropy inde-
pendent sources with min-entropy rates at least (r`)−η for some fixed constant η.
This improves on the previous construction by allowing us to extract even when the
min-entropy rate is sub-constant. This construction requires the ability to find large




Perhaps the most natural small class of sources to consider are those computable
with a small amount of computational resources. Such sources were first studied
by Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00]. This seems to be a plausible model for phys-
ical random sources and generalizes a number of the previously studied models.
They focused on the case that the source is sampled by either a small circuit or
an algorithm with a limited running time. Their main result is a construction of
polynomial-time extractors for such sources based on some strong but plausible
complexity assumptions. It would be nice to have unconditional constructions (as
well as ones that are more efficient and have better error). However, they showed
that complexity assumptions are needed for the original model of sources gener-
ated by a time-bounded algorithms. Thus, they suggested, as a research direction,
that we might be able to construct unconditional extractors for sources generated
by space-bounded algorithms. This is one of one of the primary models we study
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in this thesis.
The first example of an explicit construction was due to Blum [Blu86], who
showed how to extract from sources generated by a finite Markov chain. His re-
sults generalized the earlier results of von Neumann [vN51] for extracting from an
independent coin with unknown bias. However, the finite Markov chain model is
very restricted; it has a constant-size description and does not capture most sources
computable with small non-uniform space.
The exact model for small-space sources we consider essentially generalizes
the finite Markov chain model of Blum [Blu86] to time dependent Markov chains.
Doing so yields a much richer class of sources. This model is similar to the one
previously considered by Koenig and Maurer [KM04, KM05].
Koenig and Maurer [KM04, KM05] gave the first explicit constructions of
extractors for space-bounded sources. Their extractors require the min-entropy rate
to be least 1/2. We do not know of any other constructions for space-bounded
sources prior to our work, even space 0 sources, which are simply sources of inde-
pendent bits each of which has a different, unknown, bias.
1.6.2 Our Results
Before describing our results, we first need to give a more specific description of
the model we use for space s sources. Our model of a space s source is basically a
source generated by a width 2s branching program. The exact model we consider is
that at each step the process generating the source is in one of 2s states. This can be
modelled by a layered graph with each layer corresponding to a single time-step and
consisting of vertices corresponding to each of the states. From each node v in layer
i, the edges leaving v (going to layer i+1) are assigned a probability distribution as
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well as an output bit for each edge. Unlike in Blum’s model [Blu86], the transitions














Figure 1.1: Part of a space s = 2 source
Small-space sources are very general in that most other classes of sources
that have been considered previously can be computed with a small amount of
space. This includes von Neumann’s model of a coin with unknown bias [vN51],
Blum’s finite Markov chain model [Blu86], symbol-fixing sources, and indepen-
dent sources. Strong results in this last model will not follow directly from strong
results in the small-space model, but our results do generalize, for example, the re-
sults of [BIW04]. In fact, the only model for which deterministic extractors have
been given that appears unrelated to our model is that of affine sources, which we
discuss later.
In this thesis, we give a number of constructions of extractors for small-
space sources. All of these extractors are obtained by reducing small-space sources
to total-entropy independent sources and applying the extractors from the previous
section.
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We obtain the best results by using our extractor that uses some of the ideas
of the work of Rao [Rao06], together with recent constructions of randomness ef-
ficient condensers [BKS+05, Raz05]. This extractor extracts (δ−β)n bits with ex-
ponentially small error from sources with min-entropy k = δn. It works whenever
β > n−η for some fixed constant η and s = O(β3n). In particular, for constant min-
entropy rate δ sources, it extracts almost all of the entropy even when the space
is a constant fraction of n. However, this result requires the assumption that it is
possible to find large primes efficiently.
We obtain unconditional constructions using our other total-entropy inde-
pendent source extractors. Using our extractor based on the exponential sum esti-
mates of [BGK06], it is possible to extract almost all of the entropy with exponen-
tially small error from constant min-entropy rate sources even when the space is a
small constant fraction of n. In particular, we note that this result basically matches
our conditional result for constant min-entropy rate sources. Using our extractor
that’s based on our random walk techniques for oblivious symbol-fixing sources,
it is possible to extract almost all of the entropy for min-entropy rate as low as
δ = Ω(1/ logn). However, this extractor only works for space O(δ logn).
Note that even our best construction requires min-entropy rate at least n−η
for some small constant η. For space 1 small-space sources, we’re able to overcome
this limitation for a slightly more restricted model where we restrict the output value
at each step to be the same as the next state. In this model, we construct an extractor
that works as long as k n4/5, and that outputs Ω̃(k2/n) bits.
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1.7 Affine Sources
Another generalization of oblivious bit-fixing sources is that of affine sources. These
are sources of n bits which are uniformly distributed over an affine subspace of di-
mension k. Such subspaces are also a natural subclass of all subsets, from which
we know extraction is impossible. In this thesis, we construct 2n/2−k+m/2-extractors
for affine sources with output length m. These constructions work well for k > n/2,
but don’t work for smaller k. Prior to our results, it was only known how to extract
a single bit from affine sources with k > n/2. Recently, Bourgain [Bou07] has im-
proved upon our results by giving a construction of extractors which work for k any




For ease of notation, we sometimes assign non-integer values to integer variables
when we mean to round off the values. It is easy to observe that any errors intro-
duced in this manner do not affect our results. We frequently write our definitions
in terms of a single function f , though we really mean f to represent a family of
functions over all input lengths, so asymptotic notions make sense. Given a string
x ∈ ({0,1}`)r and a set S⊆ [r] we use xS to denote the string obtained by restricting
x to the indices in S. We use ◦ to denote concatenation.
2.1 Probability Definitions
We need some standard definitions for probability distributions. First, we express
our probability distributions as probability vectors p = (p1, ..., pn) with ∑i pi = 1.
Unless otherwise stated, π represents the uniform probability vector (of the appro-
priate length). The variation (statistical) distance |p−q| between two distributions
with probability vectors p and q is half the `1 distance, so |p− q| = 12 ∑i |pi− qi|.





A source is a family of probability distributions (a probability ensemble).
For ease of notation, we usually refer to a source as a single probability distribution.
2.2 Classes Of Sources
We know formally define the classes of sources we study in this thesis, starting with
oblivious bit-fixing and symbol-fixing sources, which are the simplest sources we
consider.
Definition 2.2.1. [CFG+85] An oblivious bit-fixing source X on {0,1}n with k
random bits is a source in which all but k of the bits are fixed and the rest are then
chosen uniformly at random.
Definition 2.2.2. An oblivious symbol-fixing source X on [d]n with k random sym-
bols is a source with n independent symbols each taken from [d], of which all but k
are fixed and the rest are then chosen uniformly at random.
Note that for d = 2t , symbol-fixing sources can be viewed as a special case
of bit-fixing sources where the bits are divided up into blocks of size t and each
block is either fixed or random.
Non-oblivious bit-fixing sources are more difficult to handle, since the fixed
bits can depend arbitrarily on the random bits.
Definition 2.2.3. [BOL90] An non-oblivious bit-fixing source X on {0,1}n with k
random bits is a source in which k of the bits are chosen uniformly at random and
then the remaining n− k bits are chosen, possibly depending on the random bits.
We will also need a slightly weaker notion of symbol-fixing sources when
converting bit-fixing sources to symbol-fixing sources.
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Definition 2.2.4. An (k,ε)-approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source X on [d]n
is a source with n symbols independently chosen from [d], of which k have distri-
butions within an `2 distance of ε of uniform.
The next class of sources we study are small-space sources, which we model
using branching programs.
Definition 2.2.5. A space s source X on {0,1}n is a source generated by a width
2s branching program. That is, the branching program is viewed as a layered graph
with n + 1 layers with a single start vertex in the first layer and 2s vertices in each
subsequent layer. Each edge is labeled with a probability and a bit value. From
a single vertex there can be multiple edges corresponding to the same output bit.
The source is generated by taking a random walk starting from the start vertex and
outputting the bit values on every edge.
This definition is very similar to the general Markov sources studied by
Koenig and Maurer [KM04, KM05]. This is not quite the most general model of
such sources imaginable, because we could consider sources that output a variable
number of bits depending on which edge is chosen at each step, including possibly
not outputting any bits. However, this restriction makes sense in light of the fact
that we are primarily interested in sources of fixed length. In this case, the sources
in the more general model can be transformed into our model by modifying the
states appropriately.
Another important class of sources we study are independent sources, and
in particular total-entropy independent sources.1
1Though for ease of presentation we define total-entropy independent sources only over sources
with alphabet size 2`, more generally the sources could be over alphabets of any size d, as with
symbol-fixing sources. All of our results naturally generalize to this more general case.
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Definition 2.2.6. A source consisting of r smaller sources on {0,1}` is an indepen-
dent source if each of the r smaller sources are independent. A set of r independent
smaller sources on {0,1}` has total-rate δ if the total min-entropy over all of the
sources is δr` and total-entropy k if the total min-entropy is k.
Definition 2.2.7. A source on {0,1}` is flat if it is uniformly distributed over a
non-empty subset of {0,1}`.
Note that when ` = 1, a flat independent source is the same as an oblivious
bit-fixing source.
Definition 2.2.8. Let X be a random variable taking values in {0,1}t×a, viewed
as t × a matrices with entries in {0,1}. We say that X on ({0,1}a)t is (t × a)
somewhere-random2 (SR-source for short) if it is a random variable on t rows of
r bits each such that one of the rows of X is uniformly random. Every other row
may depend on the random row in arbitrary ways. We will say that a collection
X1, . . . ,Xm of (t×a) SR-sources is aligned if there is some i for which the i’th row
of each X j is uniformly distributed.
We will also need a relaxed notion of the previous definition to where the
“random” row is not completely random, but only has some min-entropy.
Definition 2.2.9. We say that a (t×a) source X on ({0,1}a)t has somewhere-min-
entropy k, if X has min-entropy k in one of its t rows. We will say that a collection
X1, . . . ,Xm of (t×a) somewhere-min-entropy k sources is aligned if there is some i
for which the i’th row of each X j has min-entropy k.
2This definition is slightly different from the original one used by Ta-Shma [TS96]. The original
definition considered the closure under convex combinations of the class defined here (i.e. convex
combinations of sources that have one random row). We use this definition because we can do so
without loss of generality and it considerably simplifies the presentation.
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Finally, the last class of sources we consider is that of affine sources.
Definition 2.2.10. An dimension k affine source on {0,1}n is a source of length n
uniformly distributed over an affine subspace of dimension k.
Another way of thinking of an affine source is as a source with k uniformly
random bits with the rest of the bits affine combinations of these k random bits.
2.3 Graph Definitions
We define some standard notions used when studying random walks on graphs.
Transition matrices indicate the probability of following any edge in a random walk.
A (general) transition matrix P for a graph G = (V,E) with n vertices is an n× n
matrix with entries pi j ≥ 0 if (i, j) ∈ E and pi j = 0 otherwise, and ∑nj=1 pi j = 1
for all rows i. The uniform transition matrix P of a d-regular graph G = (V,E)
has all non-zero entries equal to 1/d. The way to view these definitions is that the
probability of choosing edge (i, j) if we are currently at vertex i corresponds to pi j.
The stationary probability vector π for a random walk with transition matrix P is
the vector such that πP = π, and is well defined for connected graphs. In the cases
we consider, π corresponds to the uniform distribution on the vertices.
For each random walk, the input is a string of values, each of which can take
on any value in [d], where d is the degree of the graph. A directed edge (u,v) is
labeled i if (u,v) is the edge taken when the random walk is at u and receives input
value i.
One property that we need in our graphs is that the error shouldn’t accumu-
late in any of the vertices. In order for our graphs to have this property, we require
that no vertex has two incoming edges with the same label. Such a graph is said to
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be consistently labeled. All of our results apply only to consistently labeled graphs.
An expander graph is a graph that has low degree, but is well connected, so
that random walks on expanders converge quickly to the uniform distribution. For
a given matrix P, let λ(P) denote the second largest eigenvalue in absolute value.
Here we define expanders in terms of λ(P).
Definition 2.3.1. A family of expander graphs is an infinite set of regular graphs G
with uniform transition matrix P that have λ(P) = 1− ε for some constant ε > 0.
We will need all of our expander graphs that we use to be efficiently con-
structible, that is, we should find the neighbors of any vertex in polynomial time
in the length of the vertex label. There are various constructions that give infinite
families of constant-degree consistently labeled expander graphs that are efficiently
computable, see e.g. [GG81], [LPS88], [Lub94], and [RVW02]. Though these con-
structions don’t work for every degree, we can always construct an expander for a
given degree by adding an appropriate number of self loops to an existing expander.
It is easy to see that doing so maintains the eigenvalue separation. We also should
note that there are expander constructions that work for degrees as small as 3.
2.4 Convex Combinations
Definition 2.4.1. Let P be a property of sources. Let X be some random variable
over some universe. We will say that X is a convex combination of sources with
property P if there exists some random variable I over an arbitrary universe such
that for all i ∈ supp(I), X |I = i has property P .
A key observation that is essential to our results is that random variables that
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are convex combinations of sources with certain good properties are good them-
selves. This is captured in the following easy propositions:
Proposition 2.4.2. Let X ,Y be random variables such that X is a convex combina-
tion of sources that are ε-close to Y . Then X is ε-close to Y .
Proposition 2.4.3. Let X , I be random variables such that X is a convex combina-
tion of random variables {Xi}i∈I . Let f be some function such that for all i ∈ I,
f (Xi) is a convex combination of sources that have some property P . Then f (X) is
a convex combination of sources that have property P .
We’ll also need the following simple lemma.
Lemma 2.4.4. Let X, Y , and V be distributions over Ω such that X is ε-close to
uniform and Y = γ ·V +(1− γ) ·X. Then Y is (γ+ ε)-close to uniform.
Note that X and V could also be combinations of distributions, so this lemma
also says that if Y is a convex combination of distributions that with high probability
are close to uniform, then Y itself is also close to uniform.
Proof. Let U denote the uniform distribution on Ω and S⊆Ω. Then
|Pr[Y ∈ S]−Pr[U ∈ S]|= |γ ·Pr[V ∈ S]+ (1− γ) ·Pr[X ∈ S]−Pr[U ∈ S]|




We will also need to define what it means to have a seeded extractor for a given
class of sources.
Definition 2.5.1. A polynomial-time computable function Ext : {0,1}n×{0,1}s→
{0,1}m is a seeded ε-extractor for a set of random sources X , if for every X ∈ X ,
Ext(X ,Us) is ε-close to uniform. The extractor is called strong if for Y chosen




In this chapter, we describe nonconstructive results for all of the classes of sources
that we examine in this dissertation. These results will help us interpret the con-
structive results found in later chapters by comparing the constructive results to
what is possible nonconstructively.
These nonconstructive results make use of the probabilistic method. We
show that a randomly chosen function is an extractor for each of these classes of
sources with high probability, and is able to extract almost all of the entropy even
when the min-entropy is logarithmically small. In particular, this argument shows
that a function achieving these parameters exists. To do so we use a standard ar-
gument that shows that a randomly chosen function is an extractor for any class of
sources that is not too large, as long as the sources in the class are close to having
high min-entropy.1
Theorem 3.0.2. Suppose we have a set X of random sources on {0,1}n and ε > 0
1In fact, if we wish to save randomness in selecting the function, then Dodis [Dod00a] showed
that we can get a similar result by using a random d-wise independent function instead of a com-
pletely random function. However, the parameters he proved are not quite as good as we prove
here.
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such that ∀X ∈X , there is a source X ′ with |X ′−X | ≤ ε2 and H∞(X
′)≥ k. Then, with
probability 1−1/22m|X | a function chosen uniformly at random is an extractor for
X as long as k ≥ log(2m + log |X |)+ 2log(1/ε)+ O(1). In particular, as long as
k≥ log log |X |+2log(1/ε)+O(1), a random function extracts m = k−2log(1/ε)−
O(1) bits.
We need the following Chernoff bound to prove Theorem 3.0.2.
Lemma 3.0.3. Let Z1, . . . ,Zr be independent indicator random variables such that
Pr[Z1 = 1] = pi. Let Z = ∑ni=1 aiZi where 0≤ ai ≤ 1 for all i, and let µ = E[Z]. Then
for any 0 < ε≤ 1
Pr[|Z−µ| ≥ εµ] < 2exp(−µε2/3).
Proof. (of Theorem 3.0.2) We’ll first use Lemma 3.0.3 to show that a random func-
tion is a good extractor for a single source, and then apply the union bound.
Let f : {0,1}n→{0,1}m be chosen uniformly at random from all functions
from n bits to m bits. Fix X ∈ X and S⊂ {0,1}m. Let X ′ be such that |X ′−X | ≤ ε/2
and H∞(X ′)≥ k. Let Zx be the indicator random variable for whether f (x) ∈ S. Let
Z = 2k Pr
x←RX ′
[ f (x) ∈ S] = 2k ∑
x∈supp(X ′)
Pr[X ′ = x]Zx
Since the function f is chosen uniformly at random, E[Z] = 2k|S|/2m. Thus
we can apply Lemma 3.0.3 to get
Pr
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Recall that | f (X ′)−Um| = maxS{|Pr[ f (X ′) ∈ S]− |S|/2m|}. By the union












Now whenever f does satisfy | f (X ′)−Um| < ε/2, we have that | f (X)−
Um|< ε/2+ ε/2 = ε. Setting the above error to 1/22
m |X | and solving for k, we get
that a function chosen uniformly at random is an extractor for |X | with probability
1− 1/22m|X | as long as k ≥ log(2m + log |X |)+ 2log(1/ε)+ O(1). In particular,
as long as k ≥ log log |X |+2log(1/ε)+O(1), we can extract m = k−2log(1/ε)−
O(1) bits.
3.1 Bit-Fixing, Symbol-Fixing, and Affine Sources
The case of oblivious bit-fixing and symbol-fixing sources is straightforward since
for any given input length there are only a finite number of sources, so we can
directly apply Theorem 3.0.2. We start off with the result for oblivious symbol-
fixing sources.
Theorem 3.1.1. For oblivious symbol-fixing sources with k random symbols, a
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function f : [d]n→{0,1}m chosen uniformly at random is an ε-extractor with output







as long as k logd ≥ logn+ log logd +2log(1/ε)+O(1).
In particular, we note that we can construct extractors for oblivious symbol-
fixing sources that even when the min-entropy k logd is nearly as small as logn,
that is, logarithmic in the total possible min-entropy for the source. These extrac-
tors extract almost all of the input min-entropy. The result for oblivious bit-fixing
sources is a simple corollary of this result obtained by setting d = 2.
Corollary 3.1.2. For oblivious bit-fixing sources with k random bits, a function
f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m chosen uniformly at random is an ε-extractor with output







long as k ≥ logn+2log(1/ε)+O(1).
As before, it is possible to extract when the number of random bits is as
nearly as small as logn.





dn−k < 2ndn−k. Since each source X ∈ X has H∞(X) = k logd, the the-
orem is obtained directly from Theorem 3.0.2, setting X ′ = X for each X ∈ X and
using the fact that log log |X |< log(n+(n− k) logd)≤ log(2n logd).
We would like to obtain similar results for non-oblivious bit-fixing sources.







, which is too large to be able to apply Theorem 3.0.2. Even
though a random function is not necessarily a good extractor for non-oblivious bit-
fixing sources, there are other techniques to bound the limits of extracting from
these sources. We will see these techniques in Chapter 5.
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Even though a random function doesn’t work for non-oblivious bit-fixing
sources, it does work for affine sources, which are in fact a special case of non-
oblivious bit-fixing sources as well as being a generalization of oblivious bit-fixing
sources. For affine sources, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1.3. For dimension k affine sources on {0,1}n, a function f : {0,1}n→
{0,1}m chosen uniformly at random is an ε-extractor with output length m = k−
2log(1/ε)−O(1) with probability at least 1−1/22m2(k+1)n, as long as k ≥ logn+
logk +2log(1/ε)+O(1).
As with oblivious bit-fixing sources, it is possible to extract even when the
number of random bits is as nearly as small as logn.
Proof. Let X be the set of dimension k affine sources on {0,1}n. If we think of each
bit in an affine source as an affine combination of k random bits, then there are at
most 2k+1 possibilities for each bit. Thus there are at most |X |= 2(k+1)n dimension
k affine sources on {0,1}n. Since each source has min-entropy k, the theorem is
obtained directly from Theorem 3.0.2, setting X ′ = X for each X ∈ X .
3.2 Small-Space Sources
Since the probabilities on the edges in small-space sources can be any real number
in [0,1], there are an infinite number of such sources, and so we cannot directly
apply Theorem 3.0.2. We instead introduce a more restricted model to which we
can apply Theorem 3.0.2, and show that general small-space sources are close to
convex combinations of this more restricted model. The more restricted model we
consider restricts all probabilities to be a multiple of some α.
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Definition 3.2.1. An α-approximate space s source is a space s source where the
probabilities on all edges are multiples of α.
We’ll show that any rate δ small-space source is a convex combination of
α-approximate small-space sources, each of which is close to the original source.
Thus any extractor that works on α-approximate sources that are close to having
rate δ will also be an extractor for rate δ small-space sources.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let X be a space s source on {0,1}n with min-entropy rate δ. The
source X is a convex combination of α-approximate space s sources, each of which
has distance at most αn2s to X.
Proof. We can write X as a convex combination of sources Xa such that each Xa is
obtained from X by replacing each edge probability p with either b p
α




We will show that Xa is close to X via a hybrid argument. Let X ia be the
hybrid obtained by the first i bits having probabilities from Xa and the rest of
the bits having probabilities from X . So X = X0a and Xa = X
n
a . Then |X −Xa| =
|∑ni=1(X i−1a −X ia)| ≤ ∑ni=1 |X i−1a −X ia|.
For each term |X i−1a −X ia| the only difference is in the probabilities on the
edges in the ith layer, which each differ by at most α. We fix i and calculate this
distance. Let vi, j denote the jth vertex in the ith layer. Let qi−1, j denote the prob-
ability of reaching vi−1, j in Xa and p0j, j′ (p
1
j, j′) denote the probability on the 0 (1)
edge from vi−1, j to vi, j′ in X . Then
|X i−1a −X ia| ≤
1
2 ∑j, j′















So the overall error is bounded by |X−Xa| ≤ ∑ni=1 α2s = αn2s.
Lemma 3.2.3. The number of α-approximate space s sources on {0,1}n is less than
2(s+1)2
sn/α.
Proof. First count the number of possible edge configurations from any given ver-
tex. There are 2s+1 possible edges, since there is a 0 edge and a 1 edge for each
of the 2s vertices in the next layer. Since all probabilities are multiples of α, there
are less than 2(s+1)/α ways to allocate probabilities to these edges. Since there
are n layers and 2s vertices at each layer, the total number of possible sources is
2(s+1)2
sn/α.
Now we invoke Theorem 3.0.2 to show that a random function is a good
extractor for small-space sources.
Theorem 3.2.4. For space s sources with min-entropy k, a function f : {0,1}n→
{0,1}m chosen uniformly at random is an ε-extractor with output length m = k−
2log(1/ε)−O(1) with probability at least 1−1/22m2(s+1)n222s+1/ε, as long as k ≥
2s+1+ log(s+1)+2logn+3log(1/ε)+O(1).
This theorem says that extractors exist for sources with space almost as large
as k/2 and with min-entropy as low as Θ(logn).
Proof. First apply Lemma 3.2.2 with α = ε/n2s+1 to show that the each small-space
source X is a convex combination of α-approximate sources that are ε/2 close to
X . Then apply Theorem 3.0.2 to the set of α-approximate sources that are ε/2
close to having min-entropy k, using Lemma 3.2.3 as the bound on the number of
such sources (since this set is a subset of all α-approximate space s sources). Since
each min-entropy k space s source is a convex combination of these α-approximate
sources, the extractors given by Theorem 3.0.2 also work with these sources.
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3.3 Total-Entropy Independent Sources
We can also apply Theorem 3.0.2 to total-entropy independent sources. Similarly
to the small-space case, we define an intermediate model to reduce the number of
sources.
Definition 3.3.1. An α-approximate independent source X1, . . . ,Xr on ({0,1}`)r is
an independent source such that ∀y ∈ {0,1}` and ∀i, Pr[Xi = y] is a multiple of α.
We use this model rather than flat independent sources because as we saw in
Lemma 6.6.4, we can lose a constant fraction of the min-entropy when viewing an
independent source as a convex combination of flat independent sources.
This lemma allows us to restrict our attention to α-approximate independent
sources. We’ll show that any total-rate δ independent-symbol source is a convex
combination of α-approximate independent sources, each of which is close to the
original source.
Lemma 3.3.2. Let X = X1, . . . ,Xr be an total-rate δ independent source on ({0,1}`)r.
The source X is a convex combination of α-approximate independent sources, each
of which has distance at most 12αr2
` to X.
Proof. We can write X as a convex combination of sources X ′ = X ′1, . . . ,X
′
r such
that each X ′i is obtained from Xi by replacing each output probability Pr[Xi = y]
with either b p
α



























where the first inequality is because each string x ∈ {0,1}` contributes at most α
error for each Xi.





Proof. Let X = X1, . . . ,Xr be an α-approximate total-rate δ independent source on
({0,1}`)r. Since there are 2` possible values for each Xi, each of which has a
probability that is a multiple of α, there are less then 2
`
α possible distributions for
Xi. Thus there are less than (2
`
α )r = 2
1
α
r` possible distributions for X .
Now we can apply Theorem 3.0.2 to show that a random function is a good
extractor for total-rate δ independent sources.
Theorem 3.3.4. For total-entropy k independent sources, a function f : ({0,1}`)r→
{0,1}m chosen uniformly at random is an ε-extractor with output length m = k−
2log(1/ε)−O(1) with probability 1− 1/22m2r2`2`/ε as long as k ≥ ` + log` +
2logr +3log(1/ε)+O(1).
Note that the k > ` is necessary because otherwise all of the entropy could
be contained within a single source, which we know is impossible to extract from.
Thus, the bound in this theorem is close to the best we could hope for.
Proof. First apply Lemma 3.3.2 with α = ε/r2` to show that the each total-entropy
k independent source X is a convex combination of α-approximate total-entropy k
independent sources that are ε/2 close to X . Then apply Theorem 3.0.2 to the set
of α-approximate total-entropy k independent sources that are ε/2 close to having
min-entropy k, using Lemma 3.3.3 as the bound on the number of such sources
(since this set is a subset of all α-approximate independent sources). Since each
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total-entropy k independent source is a convex combination of these α-approximate






We start off by formally stating our results for extracting from oblivious bit-fixing
and symbol-fixing sources. As noted in the introduction, the best previous construc-
tions for extracting from oblivious bit-fixing sources required that at least half of
the bits be random [KJS01, BS00]. We are able to improve on these constructions
by outputting Ω(n2γ) bits when the input has at least n
1
2 +γ random bits.
Theorem 4.1.1. For any γ > 0 and any constant c > 0, there exists an ε-extractor
f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m for the set of oblivious bit-fixing sources with n 12 +γ random
bits, where m = Ω(n2γ) and ε = 2−cm. This extractor is computable in a linear
number of arithmetic operations on m-bit strings.
We can even extract some bits when there are fewer random bits, although
we get a much shorter output.
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Theorem 4.1.2. There exists an ε-extractor f : {0,1}n→{0,1} 14 logk, for the set of






extractor is computable in a linear number of arithmetic operations on 14 logk bits.
For d-ary oblivious symbol-fixing sources with d > 2, we get much better
results than for oblivious bit-fixing sources. We construct an extractor that extracts
a constant fraction of the randomness for sources with any number of random sym-
bols, with the constant depending on d. In particular, as d grows large it extracts
almost all of the randomness.
Theorem 4.1.3. For every d > 2 there exists a cd > 0 such that for every n and
k, there exists an ε-extractor f : [d]n→ [d]m for the set of d-ary oblivious symbol-
fixing sources with k random symbols that outputs m = cd k−O(logd(1/ε)) sym-
bols, where cd → 1 as d→ ∞. This extractor is computable in a linear number of
arithmetic operations on m-symbol strings.
4.2 Overview Of Our Constructions
We now give an overview of our various extractor constructions along with an out-
line of the rest of the chapter.
Our extractor for d-ary symbol-fixing sources involves using the input sym-
bols to take a random walk on a d-regular expander graph, starting from an arbitrary
fixed start vertex. The extractor then outputs the label of the final vertex on the walk.
We show that even though we allow some of the steps to be fixed in advance, corre-
sponding to the fixed bits of the source, these steps will not hurt us. Therefore the
random walk behaves essentially like a random walk on the random steps only. We
use well known relationships between the eigenvalues of the transition matrix of the
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random walk and the distance to uniform to measure the number of steps it takes to
“mix” close to uniform. The eigenvalues of expander graphs are such that this mix-
ing is quite rapid, and so we can extract a linear fraction of the entropy, thus proving
Theorem 4.1.3. For d = 2, we cannot use an expander graph since expanders only
exist for degree d > 2, but we show that if we take a random walk on a cycle we
can still extract some bits out, proving Theorem 4.1.2. We give these constructions
in Section 4.3.1. We also note that similar types of random walks have been used
in previous pseudorandomness constructions [AKS87, CW89, IZ89].
For oblivious bit-fixing sources, we show that we can extract even more bits
by first converting the sources into sources that are close to oblivious symbol-fixing
sources, which we call approximate oblivious symbol-fixing sources, and then ap-
plying the expander walk extractor. This gives the extractor from Theorem 4.1.1.
We show in Section 4.3.2 that our extractor for oblivious symbol-fixing sources also
works for approximate oblivious symbol-fixing sources. To convert the oblivious
bit-fixing source into a d-ary approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source, we par-
tition the input into blocks. For each block, we take a random walk on the d-cycle
and output the label of the final vertex. Enough of the blocks will have enough
random bits so that enough of the symbols are almost random. We note that the
symbols in the output source have constant error, so we can’t just add the errors
from the almost random steps since they are too large. Because of this conversion
step, we “lose” some of the randomness, which is why we require that the number
of random bits be greater than
√
n in Theorem 4.1.1. In Section 4.4, we show how
to do the conversion and prove that the extractor works.
In Section 4.5, we show the relation between our extractors for oblivious
bit-fixing sources and exposure-resilient cryptography. Specifically, we show that
our extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources are also adaptive statistical ERF’s.
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4.3 Constructing Extractors for Oblivious Symbol-
Fixing and Approximate Oblivious Symbol-Fixing
Sources
In this section, we first show how to construct deterministic extractors for oblivious
symbol-fixing sources. We will then show how this construction can be extended
to extract from approximate oblivious symbol-fixing sources. We will use the con-
struction for approximate oblivious symbol-fixing sources in the next section to
show how we can extract from oblivious bit-fixing sources.
4.3.1 Extracting From Oblivious Symbol-Fixing Sources
In this section, we prove the following generalization of Theorem 4.1.3 to show that
we can extract a constant fraction of the randomness from oblivious symbol-fixing
sources.
Theorem 4.3.1. For any k = k(n), ε and d > 2, if there exists an efficiently com-
putable d-regular expander with λ(P)≤ d−α on dm vertices, for m≤ 2αk− 2logd log
1
2ε ,
then there exists an efficiently computable ε-extractor which outputs m symbols for
the set of oblivious symbol-fixing sources on [d]n with k random symbols.
The extractor works by taking a walk on an expander with dm vertices start-
ing at a fixed vertex and using the input symbols as steps. The output is the label of
the final vertex.
We get extractors with the longest output length when we use Ramanujan
expanders, for which λ(P) = 2
√
(d−1)/d. For certain parameters, there exist ef-
ficiently computable Ramanujan graphs [LPS88, Lub94]. Note that for Ramanujan
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graphs, as d grows large, α approaches 1/2, so the output length approaches k.
For d = 2, we can’t use an expander, but we can use the symbols to take a
walk on the cycle to get an extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources that extracts a
small number of bits from any source regardless of k. Note that we’re restricted to
using odd size cycles here, since random walks on even cycles don’t converge to
uniform, as they alternate between the even and odd vertices.
Theorem 4.3.2. For odd d, there exists an ε-extractor f : {0,1}n→ [d], for the set of
oblivious bit-fixing sources on {0,1}n with k random bits, where ε = 12
√
d exp(−π2k2d2 ).
This extractor is computable in a linear number of arithmetic operations on logd
bits.
Note that for this extractor to be useful, we must have logd < 12 logk, which
shows that we can output only a small amount of the original randomness with this
technique. In particular, if we take d = k
1
4 , we get Theorem 4.1.2.
Both Theorem 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 arise from the following key lemma.
Lemma 4.3.3. Let P be a uniform transition matrix with stationary distribution π
for an undirected non-bipartite d-regular graph G on M vertices. Consider an n
step walk on G, with the steps taken according to the symbols from an oblivious
symbol-fixing source X on [d]n with k random symbols. For any initial probability




















To prove this lemma, we show that the random symbols from the source
bring us closer to uniform and also that the fixed symbols don’t bring us any further
away.
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For the random steps, it is well known that the distance can be bounded in
terms of λ(P). This gives the following lemma, a proof of which can be found in,
e.g., [Lov96].
Lemma 4.3.4. Let P be a uniform transition matrix for an undirected, d-regular
graph G. Then for any probability vector p = v+π,
‖pP−π‖ ≤ λ(P)‖v‖.
In our case, most of the steps in our random walks will be fixed. The consis-
tent labeling property ensures that the transition matrix for these fixed steps will be
a permutation matrix. Thus these steps leave the distance from uniform unchanged,
and so we get the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.5. Let P be a transition matrix for a fixed step on an undirected, d-
regular graph G. Then for any probability vector p = v+π,
‖pP−π‖= ‖v‖.
Now, using the previous two lemmas, we can prove Lemma 4.3.3.
Proof. (Of Lemma 4.3.3.) For the random symbols we can apply Lemma 4.3.4.
Since there are k random symbols, this gives us the λ(P)k factor. We also use that
by Lemma 4.3.5 the steps corresponding to the fixed symbols don’t increase the
distance from uniform. Combining both the random and the fixed steps together
with the relation between the variation and `2 distance and the fact that the ‖v‖ ≤ 1,
we get the stated bound.
Now we can use Lemma 4.3.3 to prove Theorem 4.3.1.
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Proof. (Of Theorem 4.3.1.) We can apply Lemma 4.3.3, where in this case λ(P)≤
d−α and M = dm. Thus the error ε ≤ 12d
−αk+(m/2). Taking logarithms and solving
for m, we get the stated bound on m.
Now, using Lemma 4.3.3, we can prove Theorem 4.3.2. We first separate
out the following lemma which will be useful later.
Lemma 4.3.6. Let P be a uniform transition matrix for the random walk on the d-
cycle for d odd. Suppose the length of the walk is n, with the steps taken according
to the symbols from an oblivious bit fixing source X on {0,1}n with k random bits.
For any initial probability distribution p = v + π, the distance from uniform at the



















Proof. By Lemma 4.3.3 and the fact that the d-cycle has λ(P) = cos(π/d) (see
[Dia88]).
Proof. (Of Theorem 4.3.2.) The extractor outputs the result of a random walk on
the d-cycle. By Lemma 4.3.6, this will be within 12
√
d(cos(π/d))k of uniform.
Since cos(π/d)≤ exp(− π22d2 ) (see [Dia88], p. 26), we get the desired error.
There is one slight difficulty, since we may want to use a family of expander
graphs (or cycles) that includes graphs that don’t have exactly 2m vertices. (In
fact, in the cycle case, we can’t use any even sized cycle.) This difficulty can
be overcome by outputting the result of the random walk on a much larger graph
modulo 2m. The following lemma shows that doing so has little impact on the error.
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Lemma 4.3.7. If a random variable X is within ε of uniform over [N], then the
random variable Y = X mod M is within ε + 1/r of uniform over [M], where r =
bN/Mc.
Proof. Divide the y ∈ [M] up into two classes, those corresponding to r different
x ∈ [N] with y = x mod M and those corresponding to r +1 different x ∈ [N]. The
probability that Y assigns to each y is then either r/N or (r +1)/N, plus the corre-
sponding part of the original error ε. Since r/N ≤ 1/M ≤ (r +1)/N, the additional
error introduced for each y when going from X to Y is at most 1/N. So the total
additional error introduced is at most M/N ≤ 1/r.
4.3.2 Extracting From Approximate Oblivious Symbol-Fixing
Sources
We now show how the previous construction can be extended to handle the case of
approximate oblivious symbol-fixing sources. Our main result in this section is the
following variant of Lemma 4.3.3 for approximate oblivious symbol-fixing sources.
Lemma 4.3.8. Let P be a uniform transition matrix with stationary distribution π
for an undirected non-bipartite d-regular graph G on M vertices. Suppose we talk a
walk on G for n steps, with the steps taken according to the symbols from an (k,ε)-
approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source X on [d]n. For any initial probability






















In the case of approximate oblivious symbol-fixing sources, the random
steps in our random walk will be only almost uniformly random. This introduces
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some small amount of error into our transition matrix. We can separate out the error
terms by dividing up our new transition matrix P′ into the uniform transition matrix
P and an error matrix E, which is defined as follows.
Definition 4.3.9. An ε-error matrix E for a d-regular graph G is a matrix with the
following properties. If |Ei j| > 0, then (i, j) is an edge in G; all of the columns of
E sum to 0; and the `2 norm of each column of E is at most ε.
For slightly non-uniform random steps, we can modify the bound from
Lemma 4.3.4 slightly to get the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.10. Let P be a uniform transition matrix for an undirected, d-regular
graph G. Let E be an ε-error matrix for G. Now let P′ = P + E be our modified
transition matrix. Then P′ has the same stationary distribution π as P and for any
probability vector p = v+π,
‖pP′−π‖ ≤ (λ(P)+ ε
√
d)‖v‖.
Proof. Because π is uniform and because each of the columns of E sum to 0 by
definition, πE = 0. Thus πP′ = πP + πE = π by the above observation combined
with the stationarity of π with respect to P. Thus P′ has stationary distribution π.
Now we bound ‖pP′−π‖. We first observe that
‖pP′−π‖= ‖vP′+πP′−π‖= ‖vP′‖
since we know from above that π is stationary. Now we can focus on bounding
‖vP′‖. By the triangle inequality ‖vP′‖ ≤ ‖vP‖+ ‖vE‖. We know that ‖vP‖ ≤
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where the first line is simply from the definition, and noting that we only need
to sum over all non-zero ei j. The second line follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality. The third line follows from the fact that the sum of the square of the
errors e2i j over any column is at most ε
2. The final inequality comes from the fact
that ei j can only be non-zero when i j corresponds to an edge in G. Since there are
d edges adjacent to i, we will have at most d v2i terms in the sum for each i.
Putting everything together we get the desired bound on ‖pP′−π‖.
Unlike in the case of oblivious symbol-fixing sources, the non-random steps
may not be fixed, but may simply not have enough randomness in them. However,
we would still like to show that these steps do not take us further from the uniform
distribution. The following lemma shows that since any step chosen according to
a symbol from a d-ary source is a convex combination of permutations, the non-
random steps in our random walk don’t increase the distance from uniform. Note
that this result depends on our assumption that the graph G is consistently labeled.
Lemma 4.3.11. Let P be a transition matrix for a step chosen according to a symbol
X j from a d-ary source X. Then P is a convex combination of permutation matrices
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and for any probability vector p = v+π, πP = P and ‖pP−π‖ ≤ ‖v‖.
Proof. First we show that P is a convex combination of permutation matrices. Ev-
ery possible value from i ∈ [d] for x gives a permutation matrix Pi. If X j is dis-
tributed with probabilities αi for each i∈ [d], then P = ∑d−1i=0 αiPi, which is a convex
combination of permutation matrices.
Then note that since any permutation of π is still uniform, we have πPi = π
and thus πP = P. This gives us ‖pP−π‖ = ‖vP‖. We bound ‖vP‖ by the triangle
inequality as ‖vP‖ ≤ ∑i αi‖vPi‖ = ∑i αi‖v‖ = ‖v‖, where the second inequality
follows from the fact that since Pi is a permutation, ‖vPi‖= ‖v‖.
Using the previous two lemmas, we can prove Lemma 4.3.8.
Proof. Let Pi be the transition matrix of the random walk at the i’th step. By
Lemma 4.3.11 Pi is a convex combination of permutation matrices and πPi = π.
This gives us π∏ni=1 Pi = π, so p∏
n
i=1 Pi−π = v∏ni=1 Pi.
Let v j = ∏
j
i=1 Pi. Then v j = v j−1Pj, and v0 = v. For k of the steps, the
symbols are within an `2 distance of ε from uniform, which implies Pj = P + E j,
where every column of E j has `2 norm at most ε. Since G is consistently labeled,
the sum of each column of E j is equal to 0, so E j is indeed an error matrix. So
for these steps, by Lemma 4.3.10, ‖v j−1Pj‖ ≤ (λ(P)+ ε
√
d)‖v j−1‖. For the other
steps, we still have by Lemma 4.3.11 that ‖v j−1Pj‖ ≤ ‖v j−1‖. So for k steps the `2









Pi‖ ≤ (λ(P)+ ε
√
d)k‖v‖.
Now apply the bound relating the `2 norm and variation distance and ‖v‖ ≤ 1.
47
4.4 From Oblivious Symbol-Fixing Sources to Obliv-
ious Bit-Fixing Sources
In this section, we show how to extend our results for oblivious symbol-fixing
sources to oblivious bit-fixing sources to get the following theorem, which is ba-
sically a restatement of Theorem 4.1.1. Though we state the theorem for general
values of δ, we have in mind the case δn = n
1
2 +γ.
Theorem 4.4.1. For any positive δ = δ(n)≤ 1 and any constant c > 0, there exists
an ε-extractor f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m, for the set of oblivious bit-fixing sources on
{0,1}n with δn random bits, where m = Ω(δ2n) and ε = 2−cm. This extractor is
computable in a linear number of arithmetic operations on m-bit strings.
There are two main steps in the extractor construction. First, we transform
the source into an approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source by dividing it into
blocks. For each block we take a random walk on the cycle and output the label
of the final vertex on the walk. The approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source is
then the concatenation of these outputs. Then we use the expander walk extractor
from the previous section to extract from the approximate oblivious symbol-fixing
source.
We start by applying Lemma 4.3.6 to our degree 2 walks on the d-cycle for
each of the blocks. We will show that enough of the blocks mix to within ε′ of the
uniform distribution, for some ε′. This process gives us an approximate oblivious
symbol-fixing source.
Lemma 4.4.2. For any odd d, any oblivious bit-fixing source on {0,1}n with δn ran-
dom bits can be deterministically converted into a (δ2n/4t,ε)-approximate oblivi-
ous symbol-fixing source on [d]δn/2t , where t = d logεlog(cos(π/d))e.
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The almost random symbols in the approximate oblivious symbol-fixing
source correspond to blocks where we have “enough” random bits. Using a Markov-
like argument, we can quantify how many such blocks we will have, as shown in
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4.3. Suppose we have n bits from an oblivious bit-fixing source, where
k = δn of the bits are random. For any partition of the n bits into δn/2t blocks of
size 2t/δ, the number r of blocks with at least t random bits satisfies r > δ
2n
4t .
Proof. We know that in the r blocks with at least t random bits there are at most 2t/δ
random bits. In the remaining blocks there are less than t random bits. Combining
these two facts we get that the total number of random bits k < 2rt/δ+ t((nδ/2t)−
r), which after a simple calculation gives the desired result.
Using this lemma, we can now prove Lemma 4.4.2.
Proof. (Of Lemma 4.4.2.) Divide the input r up into δn/2t blocks of size 2t/δ.
Then take a random walk on a d-cycle using the bits from each block and output
the vertex label of the end vertex for each walk. These vertex labels are the symbols
for our approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source. We call a block good if this
random walk reaches within an `2 distance of ε from uniform, which means the
corresponding symbol is good for our source. By Lemma 4.3.6, if there are at least
t random bits in the block the `2 distance from uniform is at most (cos(π/d))t ≤
ε, which means all such blocks are good. Then by Lemma 4.4.3, the number of
good blocks r satisfies r > δ
2n
4t . Thus the output source is an approximate oblivious
symbol-fixing source with the appropriate parameters.
The symbols from the approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source then cor-
respond to our almost random steps in the expander graph, so we can apply Lemma 4.3.8
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to the expander walk to get that the final distribution is close to uniform.
Proof. (Of Theorem 4.4.1.) If δ = O(1/
√
n), we can take f to be the parity func-
tion, since in this case outputting a single bit is enough. Otherwise, let G be a
d-regular expander graph on 2m vertices with uniform transition matrix P. Choose
ε′ so that λε′ = λ(P)+ ε′
√
d < 1. Then use the procedure in Lemma 4.4.2 to con-
vert the oblivious bit-fixing source on {0,1}n with δn random bits to a (δ2n4t ,ε
′)-




Now we use the approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source to take a ran-
dom walk on G. We take the label of the final vertex of the walk on G as the output
f (r). Then we can apply Lemma 4.3.8, which gives that the variation distance from











We want this to be at most ε = 2−cm, so setting m = bδ2n for some constant b > 0








. The left hand side of this
inequality is just some positive constant, so for any given value of c we can select
b so that the inequality is satisfied. These constants give the desired output length
and the desired error ε.
Since there are a linear number of expander steps and there exist expanders
that take a constant number of arithmetic operations per step, f is computable in a
linear number of arithmetic operations on m-bit strings.
Note that in the last proof we only needed a bound on the `2 distance, which
from the proof of Lemma 4.3.8 is tighter than the bound on the variation distance,
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but this difference only affects the constants in the theorem.
4.5 Exposure-Resilient Cryptography
We now discuss the needed background from exposure-resilient cryptography and
how our extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources can be used to get better statistical
adaptive ERF’s and AONT’s.
There are a few different types of resilient functions that we define, taken
from [DSS01], each of which involve making the output look random given an ad-
versary with certain abilities. For all of these definitions, f is a polynomial time
computable function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m. Also, there is a computationally un-
bounded adversary A that has to distinguish the output of f from a uniformly ran-
dom string R ∈ {0,1}m. A function ε(n) is said to be negligible if ε(n) = O( 1nc ) for
all constants c.
Adaptive k-ERFs are defined as functions that remain indistinguishable from
uniform even by adversaries that can adaptively read most of the input.
Definition 4.5.1. [DSS01] An adaptive k-ERF is a function f where, for a random
input r, when A can adaptively read all of r except for k bits, |Pr[Ar( f (r)) = 1]−
Pr[Ar(R) = 1]| ≤ ε(n) for some negligible function ε(n).
Our goal is to construct adaptive ERF’s. We might first think that any ε(n)-
extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources would work as long as ε(n) is negligible.
However, [DSS01] show that there are functions that are oblivious bit-fixing extrac-
tors but not adaptive ERF’s. To solve this problem, they use a stronger condition
which they show is sufficient. This condition is that every single output value has to
occur with almost uniform probability. Functions that satisfy this stronger condition
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are known as almost-perfect resilient functions (APRFs), introduced by Kurosawa
et al. [KJS01].
Definition 4.5.2. [KJS01] A k = k(n) almost-perfect resilient function (APRF) is a
function f where, for any setting of n− k bits of the input r to any fixed values, the
probability vector p of the output f (r) over the random choices for the k remaining
bits satisfies |pi−2−m|< 2−mε(n) for all i and for some negligible function ε(n).
Theorem 4.5.3. [DSS01] If f is a k-APRF, then f is an adaptive k-ERF.
The following lemma shows that any extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources
with small enough error is also an APRF. We use this lemma to show that the ex-
tractor we constructed earlier is also an APRF, and hence an adaptive k-ERF.
Lemma 4.5.4. Any 2−mε(n)-extractor f : {0,1}n→{0,1}m for the set of oblivious
bit-fixing sources on {0,1}n with k random bits, where ε(n) is negligible, is also a
k-APRF.
Proof. Since f is an extractor, the total variation distance from uniform of the out-
put of f when n− k bits of the input are fixed is within 2−mε(n). Thus the distance
of any possible output from uniform must also be within 2−mε(n), and the APRF
property is satisfied.
Now using this lemma we get the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5.5. For any positive constant γ≤ 1/2, there exists an explicit k-APRF
f : {0,1}n→ {0,1}m, computable in a linear number of arithmetic operations on
m-bit strings, with m = Ω(n2γ) and k = n
1
2 +γ.
Proof. Apply Lemma 4.5.4 to the extractor from Theorem 4.4.1, choosing c > 1.
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We can use adaptive ERFs to construct all-or-nothing transforms (AONTs),
which were introduced by Rivest [Riv97] and extended to adaptive adversaries by
Dodis et al. [DSS01]. We first give a formal definition of AONTs. There are two
parts to the definition. First, the AONT is an efficient randomized mapping that
is easily invertible given the entire output. Second, an adversary gains negligible
information about the input to the AONT even when it can read almost the entire
output. This is formalized by the adversary not being able to distinguish between
any two distinct inputs. Note that the output of the AONT has two parts. We call
the first part of the output the secret part and the second part of the output the public
part.
Definition 4.5.6. [DSS01] A polynomial time randomized transformation
T : {0,1}m→{0,1}s×{0,1}p is a statistical adaptive k-AONT if
1. T is invertible in polynomial time.
2. For any adversary A who has oracle access to string y = (ys,yp) and is re-
quired not to read at least k bits of ys, and for any x0,x1 ∈ {0,1}m and some
negligible function ε(s+ p):
|Pr[AT (xo)(x0,x1) = 1]−Pr[AT (x1)(x0,x1) = 1]| ≤ ε(s+ p).
The following lemma from [DSS01] relates adaptive k-ERF’s to adaptive
k-AONT’s, and shows that our construction gives adaptive k-AONT’s.
Theorem 4.5.7. [DSS01] If f : {0,1}n→{0,1}m is an adaptive k-ERF, then T (x) =
〈r,x⊕ f (r)〉 is a statistical adaptive k-AONT with secret part r and public part
x⊕ f (r).
Combining Theorem 4.5.7 with Theorem 4.5.5, we get the following theo-
rem.
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Theorem 4.5.8. For any positive constant γ≤ 1/2, there exists an explicit function
f : {0,1}n→{0,1}m computable in a linear number of arithmetic operations on m-
bit strings, with m = Ω(n2γ), such that T (x) = 〈r,x⊕ f (r)〉 is a statistical adaptive
k-AONT with secret part r and public part x⊕ f (r).
4.6 Subsequent Work and Open Questions
Subsequent to our work, Gabizon, Raz, and Shaltiel [GRS04] have improved upon
our constructions of extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources. The extractors they
construct are able to extract almost all of the random bits from oblivious bit-fixing
sources that have min-entropy k >
√
n, with exponentially small error. Because
their extractor for large min-entropy is nearly optimal, the main area for improve-
ment is then constructing a better extractor for small min-entropy. For small min-
entropy, they give a different construction which extracts Ω(k) bits as long as
k > logc n for some constant c [GRS04]. However, in this case the error is much
higher at k−Ω(1). In contrast, our extractor for small min-entropy only extracts
Ω(logk) bits but has exponentially small error. So between these two construc-
tions we have a tradeoff between the output length and the error. An interesting
open question is to find an explicit construction for small min-entropy (k ≤
√
n)
that eliminates this tradeoff and has both large output length and small error.
Also, all of the extractors from [GRS04] have error too large to be used to get
adaptive AONTs. Because of this, it would be interesting to find ways to improve
upon our extractors in terms of output length, while still having small enough error
to get adaptive AONTs. Although it would be nice to have such improved extractors
for small k, we wish to emphasize that even the extractor for k >
√
n from [GRS04]
is inadequate for constructing adaptive AONTs, so even an improvement in the high
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5.1 Overview Of Our Results
In this chapter, we switch our focus to non-oblivious bit-fixing sources, where the
fixed bits can depend on the random bits. We give upper and lower bounds for
extracting from such sources.
Previous bounds on non-oblivious bit-fixing sources have been defined in
terms of the “influence” of variables on a function [BOL90]. The influence of
a set of variables S on a function f , denoted I f (S), is the probability that if the
variables not in S are chosen randomly, the function remains undetermined. In this
chapter, we show that the influence of a function is related to the variation distance
of the function from uniform when the input comes from a non-oblivious bit-fixing
source. We use this connection to give both explicit construction of extractors as
well as impossibility results showing that we can’t do significantly better than these
explicit constructions.
In particular, in Section 5.2, we show that if for a balanced function f
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I f (S) ≤ ε for all sets S of ` variables, then f is an ε-extractor for the set of length
n non-oblivious bit-fixing sources with n− ` random bits. We also show how any
boolean function with low influence can be used to get a function of longer out-
put length which also has low influence, and hence is an extractor. The idea is
simply to divide the input up into blocks and apply the low influence boolean func-
tion separately to each block, then concatenate the outputs. The best completely
explicit boolean low influence function known is the iterated majority function of
Ben-Or and Linial [BOL90]. Using this function, we get an ε-extractor for the set
of length n non-oblivious bit-fixing sources with n− ` random bits which extracts
(ε/`)1/ log3 2n bits.
In Section 5.3, we show that the converse to our previous result on influence
holds (up to constant factors), so that if a function has high influence for some
set, then it cannot be an extractor. We also generalize an edge-isoperimetric bound
on the hypercube that [BOL90] used for single bit functions to the case of longer
output lengths. This bound shows that any function which is an extractor must have
high influence for some set. So combining these two results, we show that at most
O(nε/`) bits can be extracted from non-oblivious bit-fixing sources.
5.2 Explicit Constructions
To get explicit extractor constructions for non-oblivious bit-fixing sources, we use
the following lemma that shows that having low influence for all sets of a given size
implies that a function is an extractor.
Lemma 5.2.1. Suppose f : {0,1}n→ {0,1}m maps the uniform distribution Un to
Um and I f (S)≤ ε for all sets S of ` variables. Then f is an ε-extractor for the set of
non-oblivious bit-fixing sources on {0,1}n with n− ` random bits.
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Proof. Let X be a non-oblivious bit-fixing source on {0,1}n with n− ` random bits
and let S denote the set of of fixed variables of X . Since I f (S) ≤ ε, for all but
an ε fraction of the choices for the random bits in X , f has the same distribution
regardless of whether the rest of the bits are chosen according to X or according to
Un. Thus the variation distance is at most ε.
Using Lemma 5.2.1, we immediately get that known constructions of boolean
functions with low influence [BOL90, AL93] are extractors. To get longer output
length, we show that we can construct an extractor that extracts several bits from
any boolean function with small influence. The extractor simply works by applying
the low influence function to blocks of the input and concatenating the resulting
output bits.
Lemma 5.2.2. Suppose there exists a function g : {0,1}s→{0,1}, with expectation
1/2, and a value r(s) such that any set S of `(s,ε) = εr(s) variables has Ig(S) ≤ ε
for all ε > 0. Then there exists an ε-extractor f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m that extracts
m = n/s bits for the set of non-oblivious bit-fixing sources on {0,1}n with n−`(s,ε)
random bits.
Proof. Divide the input into m = n/s blocks of size s. The jth output bit of f will
be g applied to the jth block. Fix a set S. By Lemma 5.2.1 we need to show that
f has I f (S) ≤ ε for all sets S of ` = `(s,ε) variables. Let `i be the number of bits
in S in block i and set εi = `i/r(s). The influence for each output bit is then at
most εi. Now we note that since the random bits for each of these functions are
chosen independently, the total influence is at most the sum of the influences for
each of these boolean functions. Thus, since ∑mi=1 εi = (∑
m
i=1 `i)/r(s) = `/r(s) = ε,
I f (S)≤ ε.
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We can apply this lemma to the iterated majority function of Ben-Or and
Linial to get an explicit extractor for non-oblivious bit-fixing sources.
Theorem 5.2.3. [BOL90] For every s, there is an explicit construction of functions




ables has Ig(S)≤ ε for every ε > 0, where α = log3 2.
Theorem 5.2.4. For every n, we can construct an ε-extractor f : {0,1}n→{0,1}m
for the set of non-oblivious bit-fixing sources on {0,1}n with n−` random bits. The
extractor outputs m = 13(ε/`)
1/αn bits, where α = log3 2.
Proof. Apply Lemma 5.2.2 using the function from Theorem 5.2.3.
Ajtai and Linial [AL93] give hope for improvement since their functions
allow Ω(s/ log2 s) fixed bits. However, their construction is non-explicit, and a
bound like that in Lemma 5.2.2 is only known to hold for ε≥ 1/polylog(s) [RZ01].
5.3 Impossibility Results
In this section, we show that it is impossible to do significantly better than the
explicit constructions in the previous section. Specifically, we show that at most
n/` bits can be extracted from non-oblivious bit-fixing sources. As before, we
will use the connection between influence and extraction. In particular, we need the
following lemma that shows that a function that has a set with high influence cannot
be an extractor.
Lemma 5.3.1. Let S be a set of ` variables. If, for some ε > 0, I f (S) = ε, then there
exists a non-oblivious bit-fixing source X on {0,1}n with n−` random bits and with
set of fixed variables S so that | f (X)−Um| ≥ ε/4.
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Proof. View the possible outputs as vertices of a hypergraph on 2m vertices. Con-
sider all possible values of the n− ` bits not in S. Since I f (S) = ε, we know that
an ε fraction of these values leave f undetermined. For each such value, place a
hyperedge between all possible output values of f (when going over all possible
values for the bits in S).
Eliminate all of the vertices with no edges. Now divide all of the remaining
vertices at random into two sets of equal size, A and B. The expected number of hy-
peredges in the cut between A and B is at least half the total number of hyperedges,
so there exists a pair of sets with at least this many hyperedges. Consider such A
and B, and look at only the hyperedges in the cut. Now each of these hyperedges
corresponds to a setting of the n− ` bits not in S. So we define two non-oblivious
bit-fixing sources XA and XB based on how the values of the bits in S are set for each
cut hyperedge. Define XA (XB) by setting the bits in S for each cut hyperedge so that
the output of f lies in A (B). Since these hyperedges have total probability at least
ε/2, these sources will differ by at least ε/2. Thus at least one of them will differ
by at least ε/4 from the uniform distribution.
We also need to generalize the edge-isoperimetric bound from [BOL90].
Lemma 5.3.2. For every function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m with output within ε of
uniform on uniform input, the expected influence over all sets of variables S of size





Proof. View all 2n possible inputs as vertices of the n dimensional cube. Color the
vertices of the cube with 2m colors, where the color of x corresponds to f (x). Now
for each possible set S of size ` and setting of the remaining n−` random variables,
there is a corresponding subcube of dimension ` in the cube. Note that f is unde-
termined over such a subcube if and only if the subcube is not monochromatic. So
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the average influence over all possible S is the probability that a randomly chosen
` dimensional subcube is not monochromatic. We divide the set of colors into two
classes, those with at most 2n−m+1 vertices and those with more, which we call
“small” and “large”.
First, we handle the large colors. Let t be the number of large colors. Each
of these t colors contributes at least 2−m to the error ε of f with uniform input, so
t ≤ ε2m. Since the distance from uniform is at most ε, the total number of vertices
with large colors is at most ε2n + t2n−m ≤ 2ε2n. The probability that a subcube
is monochromatic for a large color is at most the probability that the subcube lies
completely within this set of vertices, which is at most the probability that any
given vertex in the subcube is in this set. Thus, the probability that a subcube is
monochromatic for a large color is at most 2ε.
Second, we handle the small colors. Each small color has at most 2n−m+1
vertices. By a generalization of the edge-isoperimetric inequality, the set of vertices
of size 2n−m+1 with the most monochromatic subcubes of dimension ` corresponds





2n−m+1−` subcubes of dimension `. Since there are at most 2m small









subcubes total, the probability of a ran-





Thus, the probability of a randomly chosen subcube being not monochro-




−2ε, which means that the average influence is at least
this much.
Note that due to the tightness of the isoperimetric bounds, this bound is es-
sentially the best that can be achieved using an averaging argument. Using Lemma 5.3.2
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together with Lemma 5.3.1, we’re able to prove the following theorem. Note that
the theorem says that if m > n/`, then we can’t even extract with error a small
constant.
Theorem 5.3.3. No function f : {0,1}n→{0,1}m is an ε-extractor for non-oblivious
bit-fixing sources on {0,1}n with n− ` random bits for any ε≤ 110 min{
`·(m−1)
n ,1}.
Proof. Suppose f is an ε-extractor. First note that f must be within ε of uniform on
uniform input. So by Lemma 5.3.2, there is a set of variables S of size ` with













By Lemma 5.3.1, there is a non-oblivious bit-fixing source X on {0,1}n with n− `
random bits so that f (X) is distance at least I f (S)/4 from uniform, so ε > I f (S)/4.
Thus
ε > (1− e−`·(m−1)/n)/6.
If ` · (m−1)/n≥ 1, then
ε > (1− e−1)/6 > 1/10
If ` · (m−1)/n < 1, then

















It is an open question to close the gap between our lower and upper bounds on
extracting from non-oblivious bit-fixing sources. In the boolean case, Kahn, Kalai,
and Linial [KKL88] are able to improve upon the edge-isoperimetric bound by a
factor of logn using a harmonic analysis argument. However, their technique does
not seem to easily generalize to the non-boolean case. In the other direction, if
we could make the construction of Ajtai and Linial [AL93] constructive, we could





6.1 Overview of Our Constructions
6.1.1 Small-Space Sources
Recall our model of space s sources as being generated by width 2s branching pro-
grams. We previously saw in Theorem 3.2.4 that nonconstructively there exist ex-
tractors even when the space s is a constant fraction of the min-entropy k, even
when the min-entropy is logarithmically small. In this chapter, we describe effi-
cient deterministic constructions of extractors for small-space sources.
For space s sources with min-entropy k = δn, we have several constructions,
all of which are able to extract almost all of the entropy in the source. These ex-
tractors are summarized in Table 6.1. The first extracts whenever δ > n−η for some
fixed constant η and extracts almost all of the entropy.
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Table 6.1: Small space extractors for sources on {0,1}n that extract 99% of the
min-entropy. In this table c and C represent sufficiently small and large constants,
respectively.
Reference Min-entropy Rate Space Error
Thm 6.1.1 δ≥ n−c cδ3n exp(−nc)
Thm 6.1.3 Any constant δ cn exp(−Ω̃(n))
Thm 6.1.4 δ≥C/ logn cδ logn exp(−n.99)
Theorem 6.1.1. Assume we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] deterministically
in time poly(τ). Then there is a constant η > 0 such that for every n ∈ N, and δ >
ζ > n−η, there is a polynomial-time computable ε-extractor Ext : {0,1}n→{0,1}m




Remark 6.1.2. The assumption about finding primes follows from Cramer’s con-
jecture on the density of primes [Cra37], together with the deterministic primality
test of [AKS04].
We also have constructions that do not depend on the ability to find large
primes. Though the parameters of these constructions are mostly subsumed by the
previous construction, they are considerably simpler and achieve somewhat better
error. For constant min-entropy rate sources, we have a construction that extracts
any constant fraction of the entropy.
Theorem 6.1.3. For any constants δ > ζ > 0 and every n∈N, there is a polynomial-
time computable ε-extractor Ext : {0,1}n→ {0,1}m for space s sources with min-
entropy rate δ, where s = Ω(n), m = (δ−ζ)n, and ε = 2−Ω(n/ log3 n).
The last extractor works with min-entropy rate as low as δ = Ω(1/ logn) and
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space O(δ logn).
Theorem 6.1.4. For every n ∈ N and δ > ζ > 28/ logn and s≤ (ζ logn)/28, there
is a polynomial-time computable ε-extractor Ext : {0,1}n → {0,1}m for space s
sources with min-entropy rate δ, where m = (δ− ζ)n and ε = exp(−n/(2O(s/ζ) ·
log5 n)).
In comparison to the previous results (e.g. [KM04, KM05]) we have reduced
the min-entropy required from n/2 to n1−Ω(1) (in Theorem 6.1.1). However, we are
still far from logarithmic min-entropy, which can be achieved nonconstructively.
We also have a gap in terms of the space tolerated. Nonconstructively we can get s
to be almost δn/2 (see Theorem 3.2.4) while our results require s to be smaller than
δ3n.
Our extractors for small-space sources are all obtained via a reduction from
total-entropy independent sources. The reduction we use is based on that of Koenig
and Maurer [KM04, KM05], who used it to generalize extractors for two indepen-
dent sources. Recall that total-entropy independent sources consist of a string of
r independent smaller sources of length ` such that the total min-entropy of all r
sources is at least k. Our reduction is accomplished by dividing the source into
n/t blocks of length t. Then, conditioned on the state at the beginning of each
block, the blocks form a set of independent smaller sources. Thus, we get that the
original source is a convex combination of total-entropy independent sources on
({0,1}t)n/t . The sources in the convex combination have total-entropy Ω(k) with
high probability. Thus any extractor for total-entropy independent sources is also
an extractor for small-space sources. In particular, an optimal extractor for total-
entropy independent sources is also an essentially optimal extractor for small-space
sources.
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In a partial attempt to close the entropy gap for the case of space 1 sources,
we also have an extractor that extracts about Ω(k2/n) bits from a more restricted
model when k > n0.81. The extra restriction is that the output bit is required to be
the same as the state.
6.1.2 Total-Entropy Independent Sources
Our extractors for total-entropy independent sources are all based on generalizing
various techniques from extractors for independent and symbol-fixing sources.
Koenig and Maurer [KM04, KM05] showed how any extractor for two inde-
pendent sources with certain algebraic properties can be translated into an extractor
for many sources where only two of the sources have sufficient entropy. Their result
generalizes to extractors for more than two sources. We show that this also yields
extractors for total-entropy independent sources. In particular, we apply this to ex-
tractors for independent sources that follow from the exponential sum estimates of
Bourgain, Glibichuk, and Konyagin [BGK06] (see Bourgain [Bou05]), and thereby
obtain extractors for total-entropy independent sources of any constant min-entropy
rate. These extractors are quite simple. Each source is viewed as being an element
of a finite field, and the output of the extractor is simply obtained by taking the prod-
uct of these finite field elements, then dividing by the size of the field and taking the
most significant bits.
We also show how to use ideas from the work of Rao [Rao06] for extracting
from several independent sources, together with recent constructions of randomness
efficient condensers [BKS+05, Raz05], to get extractors for total-entropy indepen-
dent sources that extract from sources of min-entropy (r`)1−Ω(1).
When the smaller sources each have short length `, we use ideas from our
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extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources from Chapter 4 to construct extractors for
total-entropy independent sources with min-entropy k. We can extract many bits
when k > 2`
√
r`, and for k = Ω(22``) we can still extract Ω(logk) bits. The base
extractor simply takes the sum of the sources modulo p for some p > 2`, similar
to our cycle walk extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources. Using this extractor
we can extract Ω(logk) bits. To extract more bits when k is sufficiently large, we
divide the source into blocks, apply the base extractor to each block, and then use
the result to take a random walk on an expander as we did for oblivious bit-fixing
sources previously.
Unlike the first two extractors, the extractors obtained using this technique
use the full generality of the total-entropy independent sources. In the first two
constructions, using a Markov argument we can essentially first reduce the total-
entropy independent sources into sources where some of the input sources have
sufficiently high min-entropy while the rest may or may not have any min-entropy.
These reductions also cause some entropy to be lost. In this last construction, how-
ever, we benefit even from those sources that have very little min-entropy. Thus we
are able to take advantage of all of the entropy, which helps us extract from smaller
values of k.
We also show how to generalize the construction of Gabizon et al. [GRS04]
to total-entropy independent sources to enable us to extract more of the entropy.
Note that we use it to improve not only the extractors based on our extractors for
oblivious bit-fixing sources (analogous to what was done in [GRS04] for bit-fixing
sources), but also our extractors based on techniques developed for independent
sources. The important point is that their construction only depends on the fact that
we have a string of symbols which are independent, and we make no use of the facts
that the symbols are bits and are either fixed or random. Thus their proof generalize
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Table 6.2: Total-entropy independent source extractors for sources on ({0,1}`)r
that extract 99% of the min-entropy. In this table c and C represent sufficiently
small and large constants, respectively.
Reference Min-entropy Rate Error
Thm 6.1.5 δ = (r`)−c exp(−(r`)c)
Thm 6.1.6 Any constant δ exp(−Ω̃(r`))






Thm 6.1.8 δ = (2` logr)C/r (δr`)−c
easily to our case.
Independently of our work, Shaltiel [Sha06] has recently generalized the
ideas in [GRS04] to give a framework for constructing deterministic extractors
which extract almost all of the entropy from extractors which extract fewer bits.
Our extractor can be seen to fit inside this framework, although we cannot directly
use his results as a black box to obtain our results.
Applying the technique based on [GRS04] to our extractors that use the in-
dependent sources techniques of Rao [Rao06], the results of [BGK06], and the
bit-fixing source extractor from Chapter 4, respectively, we get the following three
theorems. These theorems are directly used to obtain the small-space extractors
from Theorem 6.1.1, Theorem 6.1.3, and Theorem 6.1.4. Table 6.2 presents a sum-
mary of these extractors.
Theorem 6.1.5. Assuming we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] deterministically
in time poly(τ), there is a constant η such that for every r, `∈N and δ > ζ > (r`)−η,
there is a polynomial-time computable ε-extractor Ext : ({0,1}`)r → {0,1}m for
independent sources on ({0,1}`)r with total-rate δ > ζ where m = (δ− ζ)r` and
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ε = exp(−(r`)Ω(1)).
We note that in the independent sources model this extractor gives compara-
ble results to the extractor from [BIW04] as a corollary.
The following extractor extracts a constant fraction of the entropy from any
constant rate source.
Theorem 6.1.6. For any constants δ > ζ > 0 and every r∈N, there is a polynomial-
time computable ε-extractor Ext : ({0,1}`)r→{0,1}m for total-rate δ independent
sources on ({0,1}`)r, where m = (δ−ζ)r` and ε = 2−Ω((r`)/ log3(r`)).
For the following extractor we can take ζ = Õ(1/
√
r) and can then extract
randomness from sources with min-entropy rate as small as δ = Õ(1/
√
r).
Theorem 6.1.7. For every r ∈ N, 1≤ `≤ 12 logr and ζ >
√
22`(log3 r)/r` there is
a polynomial-time computable ε-extractor Ext : ({0,1}`)r→ {0,1}m for total-rate
δ > ζ independent sources on ({0,1}`)r where m = (δ−ζ)r` and
ε = exp(−Ω((ζ2r`)/(22` log3 r))).
Gabizon et al. also give a technique which improves the output length of ex-
tractors that extract only Ω(logk) bits. We show that this technique also generalizes
to total-entropy independent sources, so we use it together with our extractor that
extracts Ω(logk) bits that is based on ideas from our bit-fixing source extractors to
get the following theorem. This theorem shows that even for polylogarithmic k, for
small enough ` we can extract almost all of the min-entropy.
Theorem 6.1.8. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for every r ∈N, `≥ 1, k≥
(2` logr)C, there exists a polynomial-time computable ε-extractor Ext : ({0,1}`)r→
{0,1}m for independent sources on ({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k, where m =
k− k1−Ω(1) and ε = k−Ω(1).
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We showed in Theorem 3.3.4 that there exist (nonconstructive) extractors
that extract even when the min-entropy k is as small as O(`+ logr). Note that we
always need k > `, since otherwise all of the entropy could be in a single source,
and thus extraction would be impossible. The extractor from Theorem 6.1.8 comes
closest to meeting this bound on k, but only works for small ` and has suboptimal
error, so there is still much room for improvement.
6.2 Organization
In Section 6.3 we describe our reduction from small-space sources to total-entropy
independent sources. We then restrict our focus to extracting from total-entropy
independent sources, starting with the basic extractors. In Section 6.4 we describe
the extractor that provides the basis for the extractor from Theorem 6.1.6. In Sec-
tion 6.5 we describe the extractor that provides the basis for the extractor from
Theorem 6.1.5. In Section 6.6 we describe the extractors that provide the basis for
the extractors from Theorem 6.1.7 and Theorem 6.1.8. Then in Section 6.7, we
describe how to generalize the techniques of Gabizon et al. [GRS04] so that we
can extract almost all of the entropy, and so achieve the theorems described in the
introduction. Finally, in Section 6.8, we give the improved extractor for our more
restrictive model of space 1 sources.
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6.3 Small-Space Sources As Convex Combinations Of
Independent Sources
Here we show how small-space sources can be converted into convex combinations
of independent sources. Thus we will be able to use our extractor constructions
from subsequent sections to extract from small-space sources. The idea is simple:
to extract from a space s source X , we divide the n bits in X into n/t blocks of
size t. We view each block as a source on t bits. If we condition on the states of
the source at the start of each block, all of the blocks become independent, so we
end up with a set of n/t independent smaller sources on {0,1}t . We show, using
techniques similar to Koenig and Maurer [KM04, KM05], that with high probability
these sources will have sufficient min-entropy.
Lemma 6.3.1. Let X be a space s source on {0,1}n with min-entropy rate δ. Then
for any 0 < α < 1, X is 2−αδn/2-close to a convex combination of independent
sources on ({0,1}`)r with total-rate δ′, where ` = 2s/(αδ), r = αδn/2s and δ′ =
(1−α)δ.
All of our extractors for small-space sources are obtained by combining
Lemma 6.3.1 with the corresponding extractor for total-entropy independent sources.
We note that the reduction in this lemma is only interesting when the min-entropy
rate δ > 1/
√
n, since otherwise the total entropy of the independent sources would
be less than the length of an individual source. In this case all of the entropy could
be in a single source and thus extraction would be impossible.
To prove Lemma 6.3.1 we use the following standard lemma (for a direct
proof see Lemma 5 in Maurer and Wolf [MW97], although it has been used implic-
itly earlier in, e.g., [WZ99]).
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Lemma 6.3.2. Let X and Y be random variables and let Y denote the range of Y .










Proof. (Of Lemma 6.3.1.) Divide X into αδn/2s blocks of size 2s/αδ. Let Y
represent the values of the initial states for each block. Then each (X |Y = y) is a set
of independent smaller sources with each block viewed as a smaller source of length
2s/(αδ). By Lemma 6.3.2, since |Y | = (2s)(αδn)/(2s) = 2αδn/2, with probability
1−2−αδn/2 the sources (X |Y = y) have min-entropy (1−α)δn and thus min-entropy
rate (1−α)δ.
6.4 Extracting From Total-Entropy Independent Sources
By Reducing To Standard Independent Sources
In this section, we show how to construct extractors for total-entropy independent
sources using techniques from standard independent sources.
The following Markov-like lemma will be used to show that if we divide a
source into blocks, many of the blocks will have a large entropy rate.
Lemma 6.4.1. For any partition of a total-rate δ independent source on ({0,1}`)r
into t blocks of r/t smaller sources each, the number b of blocks with min-entropy
rate greater than δ/2 satisfies b > δt/2.
Therefore we can view this source as a set of t independent smaller sources
on {0,1}`r/t where at least δt/2 of the smaller sources have min-entropy rate greater
than δ/2.
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Proof. We know that b blocks have min-entropy rate greater than δ/2 and at most
1. In each of the remaining blocks the min-entropy rate is at most δ/2. Since the
total entropy rate is δ and min-entropies add for independent sources, δ≤ (b+(t−
b)(δ/2))/t, which after a simple calculation gives the desired result.
Once we are in this model, we can generalize the result from Koenig and
Maurer [KM04, KM05] that states that any two source extractor of the form f (x1 ·
x2), where the xi are elements of some group, can be extended to any number of
sources where only two of the sources have sufficient min-entropy.
Lemma 6.4.2. Let (G ,∗) be a group and let Ext(x1,x2, . . . ,xb) := f (x1∗x2 · · · ·∗xb)
be an extractor for b independent sources over G , each of which has min-entropy
rate at least δ. Then F(x1, . . . ,xr) := f (x1∗· · ·∗xr) is an extractor for r independent
sources over G , b of which have min-entropy rate at least δ.
The proof is simple and is the same as in [KM04, KM05]. The key idea is
that the r sources can be divided into b blocks, each of which contains exactly one
of the high entropy sources, since the group operation cannot lower the entropy.
Bourgain, Glibichuk, and Konyagin [BGK06] gave bounds on the exponen-
tial sums of the function f (x1, . . . ,xb) = ∏bi=1 xi over large subsets of fields with-
out large subfields, in particular GF(p) and GF(2p). As observed by Bourgain
in [Bou05], this estimate gives an extractor for b independent sources where each
source has high entropy. Bourgain only explicitly gives an extractor that outputs a
single bit, but his result can be easily generalized using his techniques together with
Vazirani’s XOR lemma [Vaz86] to get the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4.3. [BGK06] Let the finite field K be either GF(p) or GF(2p) for some
prime p. Let f (x1, . . . ,xb) = ∏bi=1 xi and view the output of the function as an integer
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from 0 to |K|− 1. Then there exist functions B(δ) and c(δ) such that the function
BGK(x1, . . . ,xb) = b(2m f (x1, . . . ,xb))/|K|c (i.e. taking the m most significant bits
of f (x1, . . . ,xb)/|K|) is an ε-extractor for b independent min-entropy rate δ sources
over K for b≥ B(δ), m = Θ(c(δ) log |K|), and ε = 2−Ω(m).
Note that for constant δ, we can extract Θ(log |K|) bits with only a constant
number of sources. For GF(p), [BGK06] make explicit the relationship between δ
and the number of sources and entropy. It turns out in this case that we can handle
slightly subconstant δ, down to δ = Ω(1/(log log |K|)(1/C)) for some constant C.
For GF(2p), it’s not clear whether or not a similar result can be achieved.
Combining this theorem with Lemma 6.4.2, restricting the sources to be over
the multiplicative group K∗, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 6.4.4. Let the finite field K be either GF(p) or GF(2p) for some prime
p. Let f (x1, . . . ,xr) = ∏ri=1 xi and view the output of the function as a number
from 0 to |K| − 1. Then there exist functions B(δ) and c(δ) such that the func-
tion BGK(x1, . . . ,xr) = b(2m f (x1, . . . ,xr))/|K|c is an ε-extractor for r independent
sources over K∗, at least B(δ) of which have min-entropy rate at least δ, and with
m = Θ(c(δ) log |K|) and ε = 2−Ω(m).
It will also be useful to formulate the following corollary.
Corollary 6.4.5. For every constant δ > 0, there exists a constant v(δ) and a poly-
nomial time computable function BGK : ({0,1}`)r→ {0,1}m that is an ε-extractor
for r independent sources on {0,1}`, such that at least v(δ) of the sources have
min-entropy rate δ where m = Ω(`) and ε = 2−Ω(`).
Proof. Find the next smallest prime p > ` (we know p≤ 2`), and apply the extrac-
tor from Corollary 6.4.4 over GF(2p), viewing each source as being embedded in
GF(2p)∗.
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Now we can combine this extractor with Lemma 6.4.1 to get an extractor for
independent sources with constant total min-entropy rate.
Theorem 6.4.6. For any constant δ, we can construct a polynomial-time com-
putable ε-extractor Ext : ({0,1}`)r→ {0,1}m for total-rate δ independent sources
on ({0,1}`)r, with m = Θ(r`) and ε = 2−Ω(m). This extractor can be computed in
time poly(r, `).
Proof. Given an independent source X = X1, . . . ,Xn on ({0,1}`)r, divide it into
t = 2B(δ/2)/δ blocks of r/t smaller sources each, where B(δ) is the constant from
Corollary 6.4.4. Then by Lemma 6.4.1, we can view X as an independent sources on
({0,1}`r/t)t , where at least δt/2 = B(δ/2) of the smaller sources have min-entropy
rate at least δ/2. Find the smallest prime p > (r`)/t. By Bertrand’s postulate,
p≤ 2(r`)/t, we can find such a prime in time poly(r, `) by brute force search. Then
we can embed each of our smaller sources into GF(2p)∗ and apply the extractor
from Corollary 6.4.4 to get the stated result.
6.5 Extracting From Polynomial Entropy Rate
In this section we will show how to extract from total-entropy independent sources
when the min-entropy of the sources is polynomially small. As in the previous sec-
tion, we will reduce the problem to another model: we will try to extract from a
few independent sources when just some of them have a polynomial amount of en-
tropy, but we don’t know exactly which ones. The probabilistic method shows that
extractors exist for this model even when just two sources contain logarithmic min-
entropy and the total number of sources is polynomially large. Our main theorem
is as follows.
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Theorem 6.5.1. Assuming we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] in time poly(τ),
there is a constant β such that there exists a polynomial-time computable ε-extractor
Ext : ({0,1}`)r→{0,1}m for total-rate δ≥ `−β independent sources on ({0,1}`)r,
where n = Θ(1/δ2), m = `Ω(1) and ε = 2−`
Ω(1)
.
We can also get the following corollary for when we have a larger number
of smaller sources.
Corollary 6.5.2. Assuming we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] in time poly(τ),
there exists a constant η such that for any δ ≥ (r`)−η, there exists a polynomial-
time computable ε-extractor Ext : ({0,1}`)r→{0,1}m for total-rate δ independent
sources on ({0,1}`)r, where m = (δ2r`)Ω(1) and ε = 2−(δ2r`)Ω(1) .
Proof. Divide the source into Θ(1/δ2) blocks of Θ(δ2n) smaller sources each and
apply Theorem 6.5.1.
In this section we will describe a generic technique to turn any extractor
for the model where a few smaller sources have min-entropy rate less than half
into an extractor that can extract when the min-entropy is as small as `1−α0 for
some universal constant α0. There are two major ingredients that will go into our
construction:
• The first ingredient is based on recent constructions of randomness efficient
condensers [BKS+05, Raz05]. We use these condensers to transform a set of
sources with polynomial min-entropy rate into a set of aligned sources with
somewhere-min-entropy rate 0.9. An important property that we will need is
that the length of each of the rows is much higher than the number of rows.
We prove the following theorem in Section 6.5.2.
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Theorem 6.5.3. Assume we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] in time
poly(τ). Let X1, . . . ,XB all be sources on {0,1}`, for B a constant. Then for
any small enough constant α > 0 there exist constants γ = γ(α) and µ(α) > 2γ
and a polynomial time computable function ACond : {0,1}` → ({0,1}`µ)`γ
such that if each Xi has min-entropy rate δ = `−α, then
ACond(X1),ACond(X2), . . . ,ACond(XB)
is 2−Ω(`
1−2α) close to a convex combination of sets of aligned somewhere-min-
entropy rate 0.9 sources.
• The second ingredient is the technique of condensing independent SR-sources
from the work of Rao [Rao06]. We will generalize a theorem from that work.
We show how to extract from independent sources with only a few of them
being aligned SR-sources that have rows that are much longer than the num-
ber of rows. Formally, we get the following, proved in Section 6.5.3:
Theorem 6.5.4. For every constant γ < 1 there exists a polynomial time
2−`
Ω(1)
-extractor SRExt : ({0,1}`γ+1)u→ {0,1}m for u independent sources,
of which v are independent aligned (`γ× `) SR-sources, where m = `− `Ω(1).
We will first describe how to use these two ingredients to extract from an
intermediate model. Then we will see that total-entropy independent sources can
be easily reduced to this intermediate model to prove Theorem 6.5.1.
6.5.1 Extracting From The Intermediate Model
The intermediate model we work with is defined as follows.
78
Definition 6.5.5. A (u,v,α) intermediate source X consists of u2 smaller sources
X1, . . . ,Xu
2
, each on {0,1}`. These smaller sources are partitioned into u sets
S1, . . . ,Su such that v of the sets have the property that v of the smaller sources
in the set have min-entropy at least `1−α.
Now we show that for certain constant v and α > 0 we can extract from the
class of sources in this model.
Theorem 6.5.6. Assuming we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] in time poly(τ),
for some constants v and α > 0 there exists a polynomial time computable 2−`
Ω(1)
-
extractor IExt for (u,v,α) intermediate sources, where m = `Ω(1).
Using this theorem together with Lemma 6.4.1, we can prove Theorem 6.5.1.
Proof. (Of Theorem 6.5.1.) Let X = X1, . . . ,Xr be an independent source on ({0,1}`)r
with total min-entropy rate δ ≥ 4`−α, where α is the constant from Theorem 6.5.6
and n = u2 where u will be chosen later. Divide the source into u blocks with u
smaller sources each. By Lemma 6.4.1, δu/2 of the blocks have min-entropy rate
at least δ/2. Now further divide each of the blocks into u sub-blocks of one smaller
source each. By Lemma 6.4.1, for the blocks with min-entropy rate at least δ/2,
at least δu/4 of the sub-blocks have min-entropy rate δ/4 ≥ `−α. Let u = 4v/δ,
where v is the constant from Theorem 6.5.6. Then X is a (u,v,α) intermediate
source satisfying the conditions of Theorem 6.5.6, which immediately gives us the
theorem.
Here is the algorithm promised by Theorem 6.5.6:
Construction: IExt(x1, . . . ,xu2)
Input: x1, . . . ,xu
2
partitioned into sets S1, . . . ,Su
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Output: z.
Let v be a constant that we will pick later.
Let BGK be as in Corollary 6.4.5 - an extractor for independent sources when
v−1 of the smaller sources have min-entropy.
Let ACond be as in Theorem 6.5.3, letting B = v2 - a condenser that converts
sources with sublinear min-entropy into a convex combination of aligned sources
with somewhere-min-entropy rate 0.9.
Let SRExt be as in Theorem 6.5.4 - an extractor for independent sources that
works when just v of the inputs come from aligned SR-sources.
Set ε = 1/v3. Let α be a small enough constant to apply Theorem 6.5.3 with
α in the hypothesis. Let γ be as in the conclusion of the theorem.
1. Compute yi = ACond(xi) for every source in the input. Let yij denote the jth
row of yi.
2. For every l ∈ [u], and every j ∈ [2`γ], let blj be the string obtained by applying
BGK using the yij from all i ∈ Sl as input.
We think of bl as a sample from a SR-source with `γ rows, one for each seed
si.
3. Output SRExt(b1, . . . ,bu).
Proof. (Of Theorem 6.5.6)
If we restrict our attention to the v2 high min-entropy smaller sources, from
Theorem 6.5.3 we know that from the first step from these smaller sources is
2−Ω(`
1−2α) close to a convex combination of sets of aligned somewhere-min-entropy
rate 0.9 smaller sources.
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Then in the second step, for each distribution in the convex combination
BGK succeeds in extracting from the aligned min-entropy rate 0.9 row in each set.
Remark 6.5.7. Actually, we don’t really need the Bourgain-Glibichuk-Konyagin
extractor for this step. If the min-entropy is so high, it is easy to see that the gener-
alized inner product function is an extractor. Still we use BGK since we will need
it later on in the construction.
Thus the result of the first step in the algorithm is a distribution that is 2−`
Ω(1)
-
close to a convex combination of collections of u independent smaller sources, v of
which are independent aligned SR-sources.
Our extractor SRExt then extracts from each distribution in the convex com-
bination, and thus extracts from the entire convex combination. So our algorithm
succeeds in extracting from the input.
6.5.2 Condensing To Aligned Sources With High Somewhere-
Min-Entropy
In this section we give the condenser from Theorem 6.5.3. The first ingredient we’ll
need is the following condenser from [Zuc06], which improves on the condenser
from [BKS+05].
Lemma 6.5.8. [Zuc06] Assuming we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] in time
poly(τ), there exists a constant α > 0 such that for any t, ` > 0 there exists a
polynomial-time computable condenser Zuck : {0,1}`→ ({0,1}(2/3)t`)2t such that
if X has rate δ, Zuck(X) is t2−Ω(αδ`) close to somewhere-min-entropy rate min((1+
α)tδ,0.9).
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We’ll also need to use the condenser from Raz’s work [Raz05] with the
improved analysis of Dvir and Raz (Lemma 3.2 in [DR05]), which shows that most
of the output rows are statistically close to having high min-entropy.
Lemma 6.5.9. [DR05] For any constant c > 0, there is a polynomial-time com-
putable function Raz : ({0,1}`)r→ ({0,1}Θ(`))2Θ(r) such that the following holds. If
the input source X has somewhere-min-entropy rate δ, the output Raz(X) is 2−Ω(δ`)
close to a convex combination of distributions, each of which has the property that
at least a (1− c) fraction of its rows have min-entropy rate at least 0.9δ.
Now we can apply the functions from the previous two lemmas in succes-
sion to transform any source with min-entropy rate δ into a convex combination of
sources with high somewhere-min-entropy sources where almost all of the rows in
the sources have high min-entropy.
Lemma 6.5.10. Assuming we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] in time poly(τ),
there exists a constant α > 0 such that for any constants t > 0 and c > 0 there exists
a polynomial-time computable function Cond : {0,1}`→ ({0,1}Θ((2/3)t`))2Θ(2
t )
such
that the following holds. If the input source X has min-entropy rate δ, the output
Cond(X) is 2−Ω(δ`) close to a convex combination of distributions, each of which
has the property that at least a (1− c) fraction of its rows have min-entropy rate at
least min(0.9δ(1+α)t ,0.9).
Proof. Let Cond(x) = Raz(Zuck(x)).
Corollary 6.5.11. Assuming we can find primes with length in [τ,2τ] in time poly(τ),
there is a constant C such that for any constant c > 0 there exists a polynomial-time
computable function Cond : {0,1}`→ ({0,1}Θ(`))C such that the following holds. If
the input source X has min-entropy rate δ, then the output Cond(X) is 2−Ω(δ`) close
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to a convex combination of distributions where each source in the convex combina-
tion has the property that at least a (1− c) fraction of its rows have min-entropy
rate at least min(2δ,0.9).
Proof. Pick t large enough (but still constant) in Lemma 6.5.10 so that 0.9(1+α)t ≥
2. Then C = 2Θ(2
t).
Now we can use this basic condenser to help prove Theorem 6.5.3. To do
this, we apply this condenser to our input smaller sources and then recursively apply
it to the outputs. We might think we could just apply the union bound to show that
most of the output rows are aligned, but that is not true. However, we only need
that one single row in the output is aligned, which we can accomplish by ensuring
that at each step we have an aligned row, and then concentrating recursively on that
aligned row.
Proof. (Of Theorem 6.5.3.) First, apply the function Cond from Corollary 6.5.11 to
each Xi, choosing c < 1B . Then the output 〈Cond(X1),Cond(X2), . . . ,Cond(XB)〉 is
2−Ω(δ`) close to a convex combination of distributions Y = ∑ j β jY ( j), where Y ( j) =
〈Y ( j)1 ,Y
( j)
2 , . . . ,Y
( j)
B 〉 and ∑ j β j = 1. Each smaller source Y
( j)
i has the property that
at least a (1− c) fraction of its rows have min-entropy rate at least 2δ. Now we
restrict our attention to a single source in the convex combination Y ( j). In this
source at most cB < 1 fraction of the rows have a smaller source Y ( j)i with min-
entropy rate less than 2δ in that row. Thus there is at least one row where the min-
entropy rate for all the smaller sources is at least 2δ, i.e., the output is aligned with
somewhere-min-entropy rate 2δ. Now we recursively apply Cond to each row in
each output source. When we apply it to the aligned row, we’ll get another aligned
row with min-entropy rate 4δ. If we recursively do this t times, we end up close
to a convex combination of a set of aligned sources with somewhere-min-entropy
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rate 2tδ. If we let t = log(0.9/δ) = log(0.9`α), then these sources have somewhere-
min-entropy rate 0.9. If we choose α small enough (depending on the constants in
Corollary 6.5.11), then we can achieve µ > 2γ, as desired.
6.5.3 Extracting From Independent Sources, A Few Of Which
Are Aligned SR-Sources
Here we will prove Theorem 6.5.4. Our extractor will be obtained by condensing
the aligned SR-sources, closely following a similar construction of Rao [Rao06].
The additional complication is that whereas in [Rao06] every source was assumed
to have a random row, in our model only some of the sources contain a random
row and the rest may be arbitrary. We will build a condenser that when given u
independent sources, v of which are aligned SR-sources, outputs a distribution that
is statistically close to a convex combination of sources of the same type, with far
fewer rows in each SR-source. Our condenser can handle an arbitrarily large u and
some small universal constant v.
Iterating our condenser, we will eventually obtain just one row in our SR-
sources, at which point we can use BGK from Corollary 6.4.5 to extract from the
sources, or even simply XOR all the sources together.
To condense a single source from the input, we will take a small slice of bits
from all other sources in the input. We will use these slices to generate a short list of
candidate seeds that are independent of the source we are trying to condense. Then
we will use these seeds with a strong seeded extractor to extract from the source we
are trying to condense. In this way we reduce the number of rows of one source. In
particular, the seeded extractor we use is as follows.
Theorem 6.5.12. [Tre01, RRV02] For every n,k ∈ N, ε > 0, there is a polynomial-
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time computable strong seeded ε-extractor Ext : {0,1}n×{0,1}t→{0,1}k−O(log3(n/ε))
for sources with min-entropy k, with t = O(log3(n/ε)).
To condense all of the sources, we repeat the same construction with all
sources: each source is condensed using seeds generated from slices of the other
sources. The output of all this condensing is u sources that are no longer indepen-
dent. Still, we will argue that if we fix all the slices of bits we used to generate the
seeds, the output is the distribution of independent sources of the type that we want.
Remark 6.5.13. Although we do not include the details here, it is not hard to mod-
ify the construction in this subsection to extract even when v = 2 and u is arbitrarily
large, by replacing the function BGK from Corollary 6.4.5 in the composition below
with a generalization of Bourgain’s extractor for two independent sources [Bou05].
We can also show that our construction is strong, i.e. the output of our extractor is
statistically close to being independent of any one source from the input.
Now we describe our condenser in detail.
Construction: Cond(x1, . . . ,xu)
Input: x1, . . . ,xu, strings each divided into t rows of length r.
Output: z1, . . . ,zu.
Let w, l be parameters that we will set later.
Let BGK be as in Corollary 6.4.5 - an extractor for independent sources when
v−1 of them have min-entropy rate 0.2. Let a be the output length of BGK. Let ε1
be the error of BGK.
Let Ext be the strong seeded extractor promised by Theorem 6.5.12. We will
set up Ext to extract from sources on {0,1}ta with min-entropy at least a− l and to
have output length m, using seed length a. Let ε2 be the error of Ext.


















Figure 6.1: Notation in one source
2. For i = 1,2, . . . ,u and j = 1,2, . . . , t/2 let xij denote the first w bits of the j
′th
pair of rows in the string xi. Let xi denote the first w bits of every row of xi.
Let x 6=ij denote the concatenation of the first w bits of the j’th pair rows of all
sources except the i’th source.
3. For every i = 1,2, . . . ,u, and j = 1,2, . . . , t/2, let zij = Ext(x
i,BGK(x 6=ij )).
4. For every i = 1,2, . . . ,u, let zi be the concatenation of zi1 ◦ · · · ◦ zit/2
Lemma 6.5.14. Let Cond be as above. If X1,X2, . . . ,Xu are independent sources,
with v of them being aligned (t × a) SR-sources, then Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zu are v(ε1 +
2
√
ε2 +2−(l−tw))-close to a convex combination of independent sources, v of which
are aligned (t/2×m) SR-sources.
Proof. Let h be such that the h’th pair of rows in X1, . . . ,Xu contains a random row.
We will argue that the h’th row of the output distribution is statistically close to
uniform.
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To see this, consider the random variable X = X1◦· · ·◦Xu, the concatenation
of all the slices that are used to generate the various seeds.
We will partition the support of this variable into two sets, a good set and
a bad set. We will then make the following two claims, which clearly imply the
lemma.
Claim 6.5.15. For good x, (Z1 ◦ · · · ◦Zu)|X =x is the distribution of u independent
sources, with v of them being v
√
ε2 close to aligned SR-sources.
Claim 6.5.16. Pr[X is not good ] < vε1 + v
√
ε2 + v2tw−l
To ensure these claims, the notion of good we will use is this one: call x
good for source X i if
1. X i|X =x has min-entropy at least r− l
2. BGK(x 6=ih ) is a good seed to extract from X
i|X =x, i.e.
‖ Ext(X i|X =x,BGK(x 6=ih ))−Um ‖<
√
ε2
We will say that x is good if it is good for all the v sources that contain
a random row. Claim 6.5.15 immediately follows from this notion of good. All
we have left to prove is Claim 6.5.16. The proof requires the following simple
proposition.
Proposition 6.5.17. Let X be a random variable with H∞(X) = k. Let A be any
event in the same probability space. Then H∞(X |A) < k′⇒ Pr[A] < 2k
′−k.
Proof. (of Claim 6.5.16) Fix an i so that X i is one of the v aligned SR-sources
that contains a random row. We will first argue that X is good for X i with high
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probability. Then we will use the union bound to claim that it is good with high
probability.
X is good for X i when two events occur:
1. Event T : X i|X =x has min-entropy at least a− l. This event is equivalent to
the event X i|X i =xi has min-entropy at least a− l, since X i only depends on
those bits of X .
2. Event U : BGK(x 6=ih ) is a good seed to extract from X
i|X =x, i.e.
‖ Ext(X i|X =x,BGK(x 6=ih ))−Um ‖<
√
ε2
By Proposition 6.5.17, the probability that event T does not occur is at most
2−l2tw. This is because there are 2tw possible settings for xi. Every bad setting
occurs with probability at most 2−l , thus by the union bound, the probability that
any bad setting occurs is at most 2tw−l .
Now given that T does occur, event U does not occur with probability at
most
√
ε2 + ε1. This is because the output of BGK is ε1-close to uniform and for a
uniformly chosen seed the probability that Ext fails to extract from the source is at
most
√
ε2 by the strong extractor property and Markov’s inequality.
Thus by the union bound, the probability that either T or U do not occur is
at most 2tw−l +
√
ε2 + ε1.
Applying the union bound again, X is good for all the X i’s we care about
with probability at least 1− v(2tw−l +
√
ε2 + ε1).
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
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Now we can prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof. (of Theorem 6.5.4)
We will use the condenser Cond repeatedly. In each step we reduce the
number of rows in each of the sources by a factor of 2. We need to repeat the




Recall that ε1 is the error of BGK from Corollary 6.4.5. Thus ε1 = 2−Ω(w) in
every step, since w is the length of the inputs to BGK. ε2 was the error of Ext from




Setting l = 2`(1+γ)/2, w = l/(2t) = `Ω(1), we get a total error of 2−`
Ω(1)
.
In each step the length of the sources drops by `β
′
for some small constant
β′. Thus the final output length is at least `− `β for some constant β ∈ (0,1).
6.6 Better Extractors For Total-Entropy Independent
Sources With Many Smaller Sources
Now we show how for sources consisting of many smaller sources of length ` we
can do better than the constructions in the previous sections by generalizing our
previous constructions for symbol-fixing sources. The base extractor simply takes
the sum of the smaller sources modulo p for some prime p > 2`. Unlike in the
symbol-fixing case, we cannot use an expander random walk directly. To see this,
think of the extreme case where each symbol is uniformly distributed over only
two values. In this case we run into the same problems as in the oblivious bit-fixing
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case, since then we’d be essentially taking a random walk on a degree two graph. To
overcome this problem, we use similar techniques to the oblivious bit-fixing source
case. We start with taking a random walk on the p-cycle for some prime p > 2`, or
equivalently, taking the sum modulo p. Using the relation between the distance to
the uniform distribution and Fourier coefficients over Zp, we’re able to show that
for any prime p this is an extractor. As in the bit-fixing case, we can then extract
Ω(logk) bits for any min-entropy k. Then we divide the source into blocks, apply
the base extractor to each block, and then use the result to take a random walk on
an expander as we did in Chapter 4.
Recall the following (slightly rephrased) definition from Section 2.2.
Definition 6.6.1. An independent source on ({0,1}`)r is a (k,ε)-approximate symbol-
fixing source if k of the r smaller sources have distributions within an `2 distance ε
of uniform.
As before, these sources will be used as intermediate sources. We will trans-
form the sources we wish to extract from into approximate symbol-fixing sources
and then use the results from Chapter 4 to extract from these sources. In particular,
we will need the following proposition, which follows from Lemma 4.3.8.
Proposition 6.6.2. Let G be an undirected non-bipartite d-regular graph on 2m
vertices with uniform transition matrix P. Then we can construct a polynomial-
time computable ε′-extractor for the set of (k,ε)-approximate oblivious symbol-
fixing sources on [d]r, where ε′ = 12(λ(P)+ ε
√
d)k2m/2. This extractor simply uses
the input from the source to take a random walk on G and outputs the label of the
final vertex.
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6.6.1 Reducing to Flat Total-Entropy Independent Sources
It will be simpler to analyze our extractor for flat total-entropy independent sources.
We show that any extractor that works for flat total-entropy independent sources
also works for general total-entropy independent sources because any total-entropy
independent source is close to a convex combination of flat independent sources
with high total-entropy.
Lemma 6.6.3. Any ε-extractor for the set of flat independent sources on ({0,1}`)r
with total min-entropy k/(2log3) is also an (ε + e−k/9)-extractor for the set of
independent sources on ({0,1}`)r with min-entropy k.
This lemma follows directly from the following lemma.
Lemma 6.6.4. Any independent source X = X1, . . . ,Xr on ({0,1}`)r with total min-
entropy k is e−k/9-close to a convex combination of flat independent sources on
({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k/(2log3).
Proof. Let H∞(Xi) = ki for all i. If ki ≥ 1, we can write Xi as a convex combination
of flat sources with support size b2kic. Each of these flat sources has min-entropy
logb2kic > kilog3 , since we lose the largest fraction of min-entropy from taking the
floor when 2ki is nearly 3.
If ki < 1, then we must have constant sources in our convex combination,
so if we did as above, we’d lose up to a bit of entropy for each such i. Instead,
suppose k′ of the total entropy is contained in Xi with less than a bit of entropy
each. Call this set S⊆ [r]. Now suppose k′ ≤ k/2. In this case, we can write XS as a
convex combination of constant sources and we are still left with (k− k′)/ log3 ≥
k/(2log3) bits of entropy in each of our sources, as desired.
From now on we will assume k′ ≥ k/2. We will show we can write XS as a
convex combination of sources that with probability 1− ε have min-entropy k′/3.
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For each i ∈ S, we can write Xi as a convex combination of flat sources with one
or zero bits of entropy. The one bit sources are obtained by choosing uniformly
between the most probable value and each of the other values for Xi. Each of these
sources occurs with probability equal to twice the probability of the less probable
value. Since the most probable value occurs with probability 2−ki , we get one bit
of entropy with probability 2(1−2−ki). Otherwise, Xi is fixed to the most probable
value.
Now we can use a Chernoff bound to bound the entropy in the sources in
the overall convex combination of sources for XS. Let Yi be an indicator random
variable for the ith source having one bit of entropy. Then Y = ∑Yi is a random
variable representing the total entropy. Note that E[Y ] = ∑E[Yi] = ∑2(1−2−ki)≥
∑ki = k′, where the inequality is true because ki < 1. Now we are ready to apply
the Chernoff bound (Theorem A.1.13 in Alon and Spencer [AS00]).






Setting λ = 2/3 we get the desired error bound ε = e−
k
9 . Then with probability 1−ε
we have at least (k− k′)/ log3+ k′/3≥ k/(2log3) bits of entropy, as desired.
6.6.2 Extracting From Flat Total-Entropy Independent Sources
Now we show how to extract from flat total-entropy independent sources for small `.
Our initial extractor simply takes the sum modulo p of the individual sources, for
some prime p≥ 2`
Theorem 6.6.5. Let `≥ 1 and p≥ 2` a prime. Then Sump : ({0,1}`)r→ [p], where
Sump(x) = ∑i xi mod p, is an ε-extractor for the set of flat independent sources on
92
({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k, where ε = 122
−2k/p2√p.
Combining Theorem 6.6.5 with Lemma 6.6.3 we get an extractor for total-
entropy independent sources.
Corollary 6.6.6. Suppose p≥ 2` is a prime. Then Sump is an ε-extractor for the set
of independent sources on ({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k ≥Ω(p2 log p), where
ε = 2−Ω(k/p
2).
We will prove Theorem 6.6.5 via the following lemma, which will be useful
later.
Lemma 6.6.7. Let ` ≥ 1 and p ≥ 2` a prime. Then for all sets of flat independent
sources X = X1, . . . ,Xr on ({0,1}`)r with min-entropy k, Sump(x) has `2 distance
from uniform at most 2−2k/p
2
.
It is well known that if X and Y are both distributed over a universe of size
p, then |X −Y | ≤ 12
√
p||X −Y ||. Theorem 6.6.5 then follows by combining this
lemma with this relation between `2 and variation distance.
To analyze the distance from uniform of the sum modulo p, we use the
following lemma that relates this distance to the additive characters of Zp. For Zp,
where p is a prime, the ith additive character is defined as χ j(a) = e
2πi ja
p .
Lemma 6.6.8. For any function f : {0,1}r → Zp and random variable X over
{0,1}r,






|E[χ j( f (X))]|2 < max
j 6=0
|E[χ j( f (X))]|2,
where Up denotes the uniform distribution over Zp.
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Proof. Let Y = f (X)−Up. The jth Fourier coefficient of Y is given by Ŷj =
∑
p−1
y=0 Y (y)χ j(y). By Parseval’s Identity and using the fact that ∑
p−1
y=0 χ j(y) = 0 when
j 6= 0 we get

































|E[χ j( f (X))]|2
< max
j 6=0
|E[χ j( f (X))]|2.
Using the previous lemma we can now prove Theorem 6.6.5.
Proof. Let f (X) = ∑ri=1 Xi and fix j 6= 0. Then |E[χ j( f (X))]|2 = ∏ri=1 |E[χ j(Xi)]|2.
Suppose Xi has min-entropy ki, so k = ∑i ki. Then since each Xi is a flat source, Xi is
uniformly distributed over Ki = 2ki values. Our goal is to upper bound |E[χ j(Xi)]|2
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over all possible choices of Xi. Doing so, we get




























where  denotes the complex dot product, where the complex numbers are viewed
as two dimensional vectors, and the third line follows from the observation that the
dot product is maximized when y is in the same direction as (∑x∈Zp Xi(x)χ j(x)),
in which case we get exactly the square of the length. Now we further note that
χ j(x)y is greatest for values of x for which χ j(x) is closest to y. Thus we achieve
the maximum when Xi is distributed over the Ki values closest to y. Without loss of
generality we can assume these values correspond to x = 0 to Ki−1 (since we only
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where in the fifth line we use the infinite product representation of sine.
So




















By the power mean inequality, ∑ri=1 K
2
i ≥ r · (∏ri=1 Ki)2/r = r22k/r. Thus




Let k = δr. Then this quantity is e−(2k/p
2)((22δ−1)/δ). Since (22δ− 1)/δ is an in-
creasing function of δ and goes to 2ln2 as δ goes to 0, we have










Now we show that if we divide the source into blocks and take the sum
modulo p for each block, we get a convex combination of approximate symbol-
fixing sources, which we can then use an expander walk to extract from.
Lemma 6.6.9. For any prime p ≥ 2` and any t, any flat independent source X
on ({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k can be transformed in polynomial-time into
a (k′,1/p)-approximate oblivious symbol-fixing source f (X) on [p]r
′
, where r′ =
k/(2p2 log p) and k′ = k2/(4np2 log2 p).
Proof. First divide X into k2t blocks consisting of
2t
k r smaller sources, for t =
p2 log p. Then for each block take the sum modulo p of the smaller sources in
the block. Then f (X) is the concatenation of the resulting symbols for each block.





4tr log p . For each of these blocks, by Lemma 6.6.7, we mix within
2−t/p
2
= 1p of uniform.
Now, as we did for oblivious symbol-fixing sources, we use f (X) as defined
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above to take a random walk on an expander graph, which will mix to uniform by
Lemma 4.3.8 and thus give us our extractor.
Theorem 6.6.10. There exists an ε-extractor for the set of flat independent sources
on ({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k that outputs m = Ω(k2/(r22``)) bits and has
error ε = 2−m. This extractor is computable in time poly(r,2`).
Proof. Let p be the least prime greater than 2`. Since by Bertrand’s Postulate p <
2 ·2`, this can easily be done in polynomial time in 2` by exhaustive search. Given a
source X , first apply f (X) from Lemma 6.6.9 to get a (k′,1/p)-approximate oblivi-
ous symbol-fixing source on [p]r
′
, where r′= k/(2p2 log p) and k′= k2/(4rp2 log2 p).
Then apply the extractor from Proposition 6.6.2 to f (X), taking the graph G to be
a p regular expander graph on 2m vertices (for m to be given later). Specifically,
assume G has λ(G) ≤ 1pα −
1√
p for some constant α < 1/2. This can be achieved,
for example, by taking G to be an O(log p) power of a constant degree expander














of uniform. Then let m = αk2/6rp2 log p so then ε < 2−m.
Combining this theorem with our reduction from general to flat sources, we
get that this same extractor works for general total-entropy independent sources.
Theorem 6.6.11. There exists an ε-extractor for the set of independent sources on
({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k that outputs m = Ω(k2/r22``) bits and has error
ε = 2−m. This extractor is computable in time poly(r,2`).
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Proof. Combine Theorem 6.6.10 and Lemma 6.6.3.
6.7 Extracting More Bits From Total-Entropy Inde-
pendent Sources
6.7.1 Seed Obtainers
Now that we have extractors for total-entropy independent sources, we can extract
even more bits using the techniques that Gabizon et al. [GRS04] used to extract
more bits out of oblivious bit-fixing sources. Assuming the entropy is high enough
to use the extractors from Theorem 6.6.11, Theorem 6.4.6, or Corollary 6.5.2, we
can extract almost all of the entropy. Their construction works by using an extractor
for bit-fixing sources and a sampler to construct a seed obtainer. This seed obtainer
outputs a source and a seed that is close to a convex combination of independent
bit-fixing sources and uniform seeds. We generalize their definition of seed obtainer
to total-entropy independent sources.
Definition 6.7.1. A function F : ({0,1}`)r → ({0,1}`)r×{0,1}d is a (k′,ρ)-seed
obtainer for all independent sources X on ({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k if
the distribution R = F(X) can be expressed as a convex combination of distri-
butions R = ηQ + ∑a αaRa (where the coefficients η and αa are nonnegative and
η + ∑a αa = 1) such that η ≤ ρ and for every a there exists an independent source
Za on ({0,1}`)r with min-entropy k′ such that Ra is ρ-close to Za⊗Ud .
Now, as in the bit-fixing case, we can use a seeded extractor for total-entropy
independent sources together with a seed obtainer to construct a deterministic ex-
tractor for total-entropy independent sources. The proof for the following Theorem
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is the same as the proof for the bit-fixing case in [GRS04]. We include it here for
the sake of completeness.
Theorem 6.7.2. Let F : ({0,1}`)r→ ({0,1}`)r×{0,1}t be a (k′,ρ)-seed obtainer
for independent sources X on ({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k. Let E1 : ({0,1}`)r×
{0,1}d → {0,1}m be a seeded ε-extractor for independent sources on ({0,1}`)r
with total min-entropy k. Then E : ({0,1}`)r→{0,1}m defined by: E(x)= E1(F(x))
is a deterministic (ε+2ρ)-extractor for independent sources on ({0,1}`)r with total
min-entropy k.
Proof. By the definition of a seed obtainer we have that E(X)= ηE1(Q)+∑a αaE1(Ra)
for some η ≤ ρ. For each a we have that Ra is ρ-close to Za⊗Ud , so E1(Ra) is
ρ-close to E1(Za⊗Ud), which is itself ε-close to Um since E1 is an ε-extractor.
Thus E1(Ra) is (ε + ρ)-close to Um, which implies that E(X) is (ε + ρ)-close to
ηE1(Q)+(1−η)Um. Therefore by Lemma 2.4.4 we have that E(X) is (η+ε+ρ)-
close to uniform. The lemma follows because η≤ ρ.
To construct seed obtainers, we need to extend the definition of averaging
samplers from [GRS04] to general functions as follows. This definition is similar
in spirit to that of Vadhan in [Vad04], except the sample size is not fixed and we
both upper and lower bound the total value of the sample.
Definition 6.7.3. A function Samp : {0,1}t → P([r]) is a (δ,θ1,θ2,γ) averaging










When applying these samplers to total-entropy independent sources, we get
the following lemma.
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Lemma 6.7.4. Let Samp : {0,1}t → P([r]) be a (δ,δ1r,δ2r,γ) averaging sampler.




[δ1r`≤ H∞(XSamp(w))≤ δ2r`]≥ 1− γ.
Proof. Let f (i) = H∞(Xi)/`.
Given these definitions, we can show that essentially the same construction
from Gabizon et al. [GRS04] for bit-fixing seed obtainers works for total-entropy
independent source seed obtainers.
Theorem 6.7.5. Let Samp : {0,1}t → P([r]) be a (δ,δ1r,δ2r,γ) averaging sampler
and E : ({0,1}`)r→{0,1}m be an ε-extractor for independent sources on ({0,1}`)r
with total min-entropy k = δ1r`. Then F : ({0,1}`)r → ({0,1}`)r×{0,1}m−t de-
fined as follows is a (k′,ρ)-seed obtainer for independent sources on ({0,1}`)r with
total min-entropy k = δr` with k′ = (δ−δ2)r` and ρ = max(ε+ γ,ε ·2t+1).
The Construction of F:
• Given x ∈ ({0,1}`)r compute z = E(x). Let E1(x) denote the first t bits of
E(x) and E2(x) denote the remaining m− t bits.
• Let T = Samp(E1(x)).
• Let x′ = x[r]\T . If |x′|< n we pad it with zeroes to get an r source long string.
• Let y = E2(x). Output x′,y.
The proof of this theorem is almost exactly the same as the proof in [GRS04],
except substituting independent sources and the associated sampler and extractor




In order to use the seed obtainer construction to extract more bits, we first need a
good averaging sampler. We will show that the same sampler construction given
in Gabizon et al. [GRS04] generalizes to our definition. Our sampler works by
generating d-wise independent variables Z1, . . . ,Zr ∈ [b] and letting Samp(Ut) =
{i|Zi = 1}.
Lemma 6.7.6. For all δ and integers r,b, t such that b/r ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 6logr ≤






sampler Samp : {0,1}t → P([r])
The following tail inequality for d-wise independent variables is due to Bel-
lare and Rompel [BR94].
Theorem 6.7.7. [BR94] Let d ≥ 6 be an even integer. Suppose that X1, . . . ,Xr are
d-wise independent random variables taking values in [0,1]. Let Y = ∑1≤i≤r Yi,
µ = E[Y ], and A > 0. Then





Proof. (of Lemma 6.7.6) Let d be the largest even integer such that d logr ≤ t and
let q = blogbc ≤ logr. Use d logr random bits to generate r d-wise independent
random variables Z1, . . . ,Zr ∈ {0,1}q using the construction from [CW79]. Fix a ∈
{0,1}q. Let the random variable denoting the output of the sampler be Samp(Ut) =
{i|Zi = a}. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, define a random variable Yi that is set to f (i) if i ∈
Samp(Ut) and 0 otherwise. Let Y = ∑iYi (note that Y is exactly the sum we wish
to bound). Note that µ = E[Y ] = δr/2q and that the random variables Y1, . . . ,Yr are
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d-wise independent. Applying Theorem 6.7.7 with A = δr/2b,








{|Y −µ|< A} ⊆ {δr
2q


















Note that d ≤ tlogr ≤
δr

































≥ 1−2−(d/2+3) ≥ 1−2−Ω(t/ logr).
6.7.3 Extractors From Seed Obtainers
As in [GRS04] it will be convenient to combine Theorem 6.7.2 and Theorem 6.7.5
to get the following theorem.
Theorem 6.7.8. Assume we have the following:
• A (δ,δ1r,δ2r,γ) averaging sampler Samp : {0,1}t → P([r]).
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• A deterministic ε∗-extractor for total-rate δ1 independent sources
E∗ : ({0,1}`)r→{0,1}m′ .
• A seeded ε1-extractor for total-rate δ−δ2 independent sources
E1 : ({0,1}`)r×{0,1}s→{0,1}m, where m′ ≥ s+ t.
Then we get a deterministic ε-extractor for total-rate δ independent sources
E : ({0,1}`)r→{0,1}m where ε = ε1 +3 ·max(ε∗+ γ,ε∗ ·2t+1).
We will use the following seeded extractor from Raz, Reingold, and Vadhan
[RRV99].
Theorem 6.7.9. [RRV99] For any r,k, and ε > 0, there exists a seeded ε-extractor
Ext : {0,1}r×{0,1}s→ {0,1}m for all sources with min-entropy k, where m = k
and s = Θ(log2 r · log(1/ε) · logm).
Combining the extractor from [RRV99] with the sampler from the previous
section, we get the following general corollary, which shows how to transform a de-
terministic extractor that extracts just some of the min-entropy into one that extracts
almost all of the min-entropy.
Corollary 6.7.10. Let δ,δ1,ε1 and integers r, t be such that δ1 ≥ 1/2r and 6logr≤
t ≤ δ1r logr10 . Also let m = (δ−6δ1)r` and s = Θ(log
2(r`) · log(1/ε1) · logm). Then
given any deterministic ε∗-extractor for total-rate δ1 independent sources
E∗ : ({0,1}`)r→{0,1}m′ with m′ ≥ s+ t, we can construct an ε-extractor for total-
rate δ independent sources E : ({0,1}`)r → {0,1}m where ε = ε1 + 3 ·max(ε∗+
2−Ω(t/ logr),ε∗ ·2t+1).
Proof. Combine Lemma 6.7.6 with b = δ/2δ1, Theorem 6.7.9, and Theorem 6.7.8.
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Now we can use Corollary 6.7.10 together with our previous deterministic
extractor construction from Theorem 6.6.11 to show how we can extract nearly all
of the entropy from total-entropy independent sources with sufficiently high min-
entropy, proving Theorem 6.1.7.
Proof. (Of Theorem 6.1.7.) Use the construction from Corollary 6.7.10 with the ex-
tractor from Theorem 6.6.11 as E∗ and let ε1 = 2−Ω((δ
2
1r`)(2




Then it’s not hard to see that (choosing appropriate constants) these values satisfy
6 logr ≤ t ≤ δ1r logr10 and m
′ ≥ s+ t for sufficiently large r.
The extractor for small-space sources from Theorem 6.1.4 is then obtained
by combining Theorem 6.1.7 with Lemma 6.3.1.
We could also use a seed obtainer together with the extractor for constant
rate sources from Theorem 6.4.6. This lets us extract any constant fraction of the
entropy and proves Theorem 6.1.6.
Proof. (Of Theorem 6.1.6.) Use the construction from Corollary 6.7.10 with the
extractor from Theorem 6.4.6 as E∗ and let ε1 = 2−Ω((r`)/(log
3(r`))) and
t = Θ(r log(min(2`,r))). Then it’s not hard to see that (choosing appropriate con-
stants) these values satisfy 6 logr≤ t ≤ δ1r logr10 and m
′≥ s+t for sufficiently large r.
The extractor for small-space sources from Theorem 6.1.3 is then obtained
by combining Theorem 6.1.7 with Lemma 6.3.1.
We can also apply this construction to the polynomial entropy rate extractor
from Corollary 6.5.2, which proves Theorem 6.1.5.
Proof. (Of Theorem 6.1.5.) Use the construction from Corollary 6.7.10 with the ex-
tractor from Corollary 6.5.2 as E∗ and let ε1 = 2−(δ
2
1r`)
Ω(1)/(log3(r`)) and t =(δ21r`)
Ω(1).
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Then it’s not hard to see that (choosing appropriate constants) these values satisfy
6 logr ≤ t ≤ δ1r logr10 and m
′ ≥ s+ t for sufficiently large r.
The extractor for small-space sources from Theorem 6.1.1 is then obtained
by combining Theorem 6.1.5 with Lemma 6.3.1.
6.7.4 Extractors For Smaller Entropy
Gabizon et. al [GRS04] also showed how to use seed obtainers to extract more
bits even when the initial extractor only extracts Θ(logk) bits, which they’re able to
get from the cycle walk extractor described in Chapter 4. We can generalize their
construction to work for total-entropy independent sources, which together with
our generalization of the cycle walk extractor allows us to extract more bits from
smaller entropy rates.
In order to get a seed obtainer that can use only Θ(logk) bits, we need both
a sampler and a seeded extractor for total-entropy independent sources. To do so,
as in [GRS04], we use d-wise ε-dependent random variables to both sample and
partition. The proofs of the following two lemmas easily generalize the construction
from [GRS04] in a similar way to our earlier sampler construction.
Lemma 6.7.11. For any constant 0 < α < 1, there exist constants c > 0 and 0 < b <
1/2 (both depending on α) such that for any r ≥ 16 and k = δr` ≥ logc r, the fol-
lowing holds. There is a polynomial-time computable (δ,δr/2kb,3δr/kb,O(k−b))
sampler Samp : {0,1}t → P([r]) where t = α · logk.
Lemma 6.7.12. Fix any constant 0 < α < 1. There exist constants c > 0 and 0 <
b < 1/2 (both depending on α) such that for any r ≥ 16 and k = δr` ≥ logc r, we
can use α · logk random bits to explicitly partition [r] into m = Θ(kb) sets T1, . . . ,Tm
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f ( j)≤ 3δr/kb
]
≥ 1−O(k−b).
As in Lemma 6.7.6, this lemma implies that if we partition a total-rate δ
independent source, with high probability each Ti has some min-entropy.
Corollary 6.7.13. For any constant 0 < α < 1, there exist constants c > 0 and 0 <
b < 1/2 (both depending on α) such that for any r≥ 16 and k≥ logc r, the following
holds. We can use α · logk random bits to explicitly partition [r] into m = Θ(kb) sets







Now we will use this partitioning to construct a seeded extractor for total-
entropy independent sources that uses a small seed. As in [GRS04] once we parti-
tion the source, we apply an extractor to each part. The extractor we will use is our
sum mod p extractor.
Theorem 6.7.14. For any constant 0 < α < 1, there exist constants c > 0 and 0 <
b < 1/2 (both depending on α) such that for any r ≥ 16, k ≥ logc r, 0 < δ ≤ 1
and ` ≤ log(k(1−b)/2/
√
logk2b), the following holds. There is a polynomial-time
computable seeded ε-extractor E : ({0,1}`)r×{0,1}s → {0,1}m for independent
sources on ({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k = δr`, with s = α · logk, m = Θ(kb`)
and ε = O(k−b).
Proof. As stated above, E works by first partitioning the input x into m′ = Θ(kb)
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parts T1, . . . ,Tm′ using Corollary 6.7.13. Next we find the next largest prime p ≥
2`, which by Bertrand’s postulate is at most 2 · 2`, so we can find it efficiently by
brute force search. Then for each Ti we compute zi = ∑ j∈Ti x j mod p and output
z = zi, . . . ,zm].
Let Z be the distribution of the output string z. Let A be the “good” event
that all sets Ti have entropy at least k1−b/2. Then we decompose Z as
Z = Pr[Ac] · (Z|Ac)+Pr[A] · (Z|A).
Now by Corollary 6.7.13, Pr[A] ≥ 1−O(k−b). By Corollary 6.6.6, (Z|A) is m′ ·
2−Ω(k
1−b/22`) close to uniform. Since ` ≤ log(k(1−b)/2/
√
logk2b), (Z|A) is O(k−b)
close to uniform. Thus by Lemma 2.4.4, Z is O(k−b) close to uniform.
Now we are ready to combine these ingredients using Theorem 6.7.8 to get
an improved extractor.
Theorem 6.7.15. There exist constants c > 0 and 0 < b < 1/2 such that for k ≥
logc r and 2`≤O(k(1−b)/2/
√
logk2b), the following holds. There exists a polynomial-
time computable ε-extractor E : ({0,1}`)r → {0,1}m for independent sources on
({0,1}`)r with min-entropy k, where m = Θ(kb`) and ε = O(k−b).
Proof. Use Theorem 6.7.8 together with the sampler from Lemma 6.7.11, the de-
terministic extractor from Corollary 6.6.6, and the seeded extractor from Theo-
rem 6.7.14
This still doesn’t get all of the entropy out of the source, but now we have a
long enough output that we can use the seeded extractor from Theorem 6.7.9 to get
the rest of the entropy, which proves Theorem 6.1.8.
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Proof. (Of Theorem 6.1.8.) Use Theorem 6.7.8 together with the sampler from
Lemma 6.7.11, the deterministic extractor from Theorem 6.7.15, and the seeded
extractor from Theorem 6.7.9.
6.8 Doing Better For Width Two
In this section we consider the case of space 1 (width 2) sources where the output bit
is restricted to be the same as the label of the next state, which we will call restricted
width two sources. For such sources, we can improve our results by decreasing the
alphabet size in the total-entropy independent sources. This will allow us to extract
from smaller entropy rates. We will need the following class of sources.
Definition 6.8.1. A previous-bit source on {0,1}n with min-entropy k has at least k
uniformly random bits and the rest of the bits are functions of the previous bit.
We will show that restricted width two sources are close to a convex combi-
nation of previous-bit sources, and then show that these previous bit sources can be
converted into total-entropy independent sources with small alphabet size.
6.8.1 Extracting From Previous-Bit Sources
To convert a previous-bit source to a total-entropy independent source, we first
divide the source into blocks as before, but instead of simply viewing each block
as a binary number, we apply a function to reduce the alphabet size while still
maintaining some of the entropy. Specifically, we will show that if a block has at
least one random bit, then the output symbol will have at least one bit of entropy.
The main lemma is as follows.
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Lemma 6.8.2. Any length n previous-bit source X with min-entropy k can be con-
verted in polynomial time to a convex combination of flat independent sources on
({0,1}`)r with min-entropy k′, where r = k2 , k





The following lemma shows that any block that contains at least one random
bit will give a random source.
Lemma 6.8.3. We can construct a function f : {0,1}t →{0,1}dlog(t+1)e so that for
any previous-bit source Y on {0,1}t with exactly one random bit, f attains different
values depending on whether the random bit in Y is set to 0 or 1.
Proof. For 0 ≤ i ≤ t, let zi ∈ Z
dlog(t+1)e
2 be the standard representation of i as a
vector over Z2. (More generally, we only require the zi to be distinct vectors.) Then
f (y) = ∑ti=1 yi(zi− zi−1).
Let y0 (y1) be Y with the random bit set to 0 (1). Now we show that f (y0) 6=
f (y1). We see that





It’s easy to see that y0i− y1i will be 0 for all fixed bits and 1 whenever the random
bit or its negation appears. For our sources, all appearances of the random bit must
appear consecutively. This means that if the random bit appears from positions j
through k, f (y0)− f (y1) = zk− z j−1, since all of the other terms cancel. Thus since
zk 6= z j−1, f (y0)− f (y1) 6= 0.
Now we can prove Lemma 6.8.2.
Proof. Divide X into r = k/2 blocks of size n/r = 2n/k. Then apply the function f
from Lemma 6.8.3 to each block to get Y .
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To see that this works, fix all of the random bits that cross between blocks.
Also, for each block fix all but one of the random bits that are contained within the
block. Now X is a convex combination of all of the sources given by every possible
such fixing. Let X ′ be a source corresponding to one particular fixing. We will show
that if we apply f to every block of X ′, we will get a source with enough random
blocks. Any block of X ′ with a random source is a previous-bit source with one
random bit, so we can apply Lemma 6.8.3 to see that the output of f on this block
is uniformly chosen from among two different sources, as desired.
Now we just need to see how many blocks with at least one random bit there
are. There can be at most r random bits that cross between blocks. So removing
those bits we are left with at least k− r = k/2 random bits. These k/2 random
bits must be contained in at least k′ = (k/2)/(n/r) = k2/4n different blocks, which
gives us the desired bound.
Now we can combine Theorem 6.1.7 and Lemma 6.8.2 to get an extractor
for previous-bit sources.
Theorem 6.8.4. There exists a polynomial-time computable ε-extractor for the set
of previous-bit sources of length n with min-entropy k that outputs m = k
2
8n bits and
has error ε = exp(−Ω(k5/(n4 log(n/k) log3 k))).
Proof. Given a source X , apply Lemma 6.8.2 to convert X into a convex combina-
tion of flat independent sources on ({0,1}`)r with total min-entropy k′, where r = k2 ,
k′ = k
2





e. Then apply the extractor from Theorem 6.1.7 with
ζ = k2/(48n · r`).
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6.8.2 Restricted Width Two Sources As Convex Combinations
Of Previous-Bit Sources
To show we can extract from restricted width two sources, we will prove that these
sources can be viewed as convex combinations of previous bit sources. With high
probability, these previous-bit sources will have sufficient entropy so that our ex-
tractor from the previous section will work.
Lemma 6.8.5. Any length n restricted width two source X with min-entropy k is a
convex combination of length n previous bit sources Z j so that with probability at
least 1−2−k/4−e−9k′2/2n, the sources Z j have at least k′= min(k/48log(n/k),k/96)
random bits.
To get our extractor, we just combine this lemma with the extractor from
Theorem 6.8.4.
Theorem 6.8.6. There exists a polynomial-time computable ε-extractor for the
set of length n restricted width two sources with min-entropy k that outputs m =
Ω(k2/n(max(log(n/k),1))2) bits and has error ε = 2−Ω((k
′)5/(n4 log(n/k′) log3 k′ , where
k′ = min(k/48log(n/k),k/96).
Proof. By Lemma 6.8.5 our source X is 2−k/4 + e−9k
′2/2n close to a convex combi-
nation of length n previous-bit sources with k′ = min(k/48log(n/k),k/96) random




Notice that here we only need k n4/5 whereas before we required k
n1−η for some small constant η.
Now we describe how we express the restricted width two source X as a
convex combination of previous-bit sources Z j. This is done recursively on the
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layers of the branching program for the source. We say we are in a given state at
each layer; either “open”, “closed at 0”, or “closed at 1”. Each sequence of states
corresponds to a previous-bit source. The way we divide the next layer up depends
on the state we are in. The high level picture is that each random bit corresponds to
going into the open state, which we are in until we get a fixed bit, which takes us to
the corresponding closed state. We stay closed until another random bit occurs. An
example is shown in Figure 6.8.2.
0
1
Closed at 0 Open Closed at 1 Closed at 0
Figure 6.2: A previous-bit source viewed as a restricted width two source. This
source consists of the bits 0,0,r,r,r,1,0, where r is a random bit.
More formally, we define the following probabilities, shown in Figure 6.8.2.
pi0 = Pr[Xi = 0|Xi−1 = 0]
pi1 = Pr[Xi = 1|Xi−1 = 0]
qi0 = Pr[Xi = 0|Xi−1 = 1]
qi1 = Pr[Xi = 1|Xi−1 = 1]
First, we describe what happens if we are currently in the open state. The
next bit is fixed to 0 (resp. 1) and the state becomes closed at 0 (1) with probability
min(pi0,qi0) (min(pi1,qi1)). Else we stay in the open state and the next bit is either
equal to the previous bit or the negation of the previous bit depending on which








Figure 6.3: The probabilities for a single bit of a restricted width two source.
If we are closed at 0, the next bit is random and we go into the open state
with probability 2min(pi0, pi1). If pi0 < pi1, the next bit is fixed to 1 and we go into
the closed at 1 state with probability 1−2pi0. Else the next bit is fixed to 0 and we
go into the closed at 0 state with probability 1−2pi1.
If we are closed at 1, the next bit is random and we go into the open state
with probability 2min(qi0,qi1). If qi0 < qi1, the next bit is fixed to 1 and we go into
the closed at 1 state with probability 1−2qi0. Else the next bit is fixed to 0 and we
go into the closed at 0 state with probability 1−2qi1.
Now we show that with high probability, the sources in the convex combina-
tion have sufficient min-entropy. We do this by looking at the relationships between
paths in the original source X and the min-entropy of the Z j. First, note that each
path in the branching program corresponds to an output value of X , so each path
has probability at most 2−k. Note that the min-entropy of Z j is equal to the number
of openings in Z j.
Each path can be divided into edges that are the most probable edge coming
out of a node and those that are the least probable. We will show how the number
of least probable edges on a path in X relates to the min-entropy of a Z j that con-
tains this path. First note that every least probable edge corresponds to either an
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opening, a closing, or what we call a “false closing”. A false closing is defined as
transitioning from the open state to the open state yet still taking a least probable
edge. Let C(Z j) denote the number of closings in Z j, A(Z j) denote the number of
openings, and B(Z j) denote the number of false closings.
If we could ignore the false closings, showing that with high probability
we take the least probable edge a large number of times would be enough. Since
C(Z j)≤ A(Z j), this would imply that with high probability A(Z j) is large, and thus
the Z j have large min-entropy with high probability. To take account of the false
closings, we also have to show that there aren’t too many of them, which we will
do by a martingale argument.
First, we show that with high probability over all paths in X , we take the
least probable edge a large number of times.
Lemma 6.8.7. For any length n restricted width two source with min-entropy k, the
total probability of all paths that have at most t = min(k/8log(n/k),k/16) least
probable edges is less than 2−k/4.





paths that have i least probable edges. Thus the total probability of









≤ 2−k2nH(t/n) < 2−k+2t log(n/t)
where H(t/n) is the standard Shannon entropy H(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1−
p).
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Thus the probability of taking at most t least probable edges is at most 2−k+2t log(n/t)≤
2−k/4.
To show that the number of false closings is small, we first define a sub-
martingale that is equal to the number of closings minus the number of false clos-
ings after the first i bits. Then we use the following simple variant of Azuma’s
inequality for submartingales (see [Wor99] for a proof).
Definition 6.8.8. A submartingale with respect to a random process G0,G1, . . .,
with G0 fixed, is a sequence Y0,Y1, . . . of random variable defined on the random
process such that
E[Yi+1|G0,G1, . . . ,Gi]≥ Yi
for all i≥ 0.
Lemma 6.8.9. Let Y0,Y1, . . . ,Yn be a submartingale with respect to G0,G1, . . . ,Gn
where Y0 = 0 and |Yi−Yi−1| ≤ 1 for i≥ 1. Then for all α > 0,
Pr[Yn ≤−α]≤ e−α
2/2n.
Now we are ready to prove that with high probability the number of false
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closings can’t be too large.
Lemma 6.8.10. For all α > 0,
Pr[B(Z j)≥C(Z j)+α]≤ e−α
2/2n.
Proof. Let Yi be the number of closings from X1, . . . ,Xi minus the number of false
closings from X1, . . . ,Xi and let Y0 = 0. Let G0,G1, . . . ,Gn be the random process
for dividing X into previous-bit sources, so Gi is the state after the first i bits have
been divided.
Now we show that Y0, . . . ,Yn is a submartingale with respect to G0,G1, . . . ,Gn.
If we are in a closed state after i bits, then we have no closings or false closings at
i+1, so E[Yi+1|G0,G1, . . . ,Gi] = Yi. If we are in an open state at i, we show that if
we have the possibility of a false closing at i + 1, then the probability of closing is
greater than 1/2, and in particular is greater than the probability of a false closing.
This would imply that E[Yi+1|G0,G1, . . . ,Gi] ≥ Yi, as desired. First, note that the
probability of closing at i+1 is
min(pi+1,0,qi+1,0)+min(pi+1,1,qi+1,1) = min(pi+1,0 +qi+1,1,qi+1,0 + pi+1,1).
Suppose without loss of generality that pi+1,0 +qi+1,1 ≥ qi+1,0 + pi+1,1, so we close
with probability qi+1,0 + pi+1,1. In this case, the edges we would take in a false
closing are the 00 and 11 edges. So if we have a false closing, either pi+1,0 ≤ 1/2
or qi+1,1 ≤ 1/2, which implies either pi+1,1 ≥ 1/2 or qi+1,0 ≥ 1/2, and thus the
probability of closing is at least 1/2.
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By the definition of Yi, |Yi−Yi−1| ≤ 1, so we can apply Lemma 6.8.9 to get
Pr[Yn ≤−α]≤ e−α
2/2n,
which implies the desired result.
Now we are finally ready to prove Lemma 6.8.5.
Proof. (Of Lemma 6.8.5.)
First, express the restricted width two source X as a convex combination
of previous-bit sources Z j as described previously, so X = ∑ j α jZ j. Now consider
a randomly chosen Z j, chosen with probability α j. The number of random bits
in Z j is equal to the number of openings A(Z j). Since the number of closings is
either equal to or one less than the number of openings, either C(Z j) = A(Z j) or
C(Z j) = A(Z j)− 1. So if we can prove with high probability that C(Z j) is large,
then with high probability the number of random bits in Z j is also large. For every
path in Z j, every least probable edge on the path corresponds to either an opening,
a closing, or a false closing. Thus the probability that A(Z j)+B(Z j)+C(Z j)≥ s is
at least the probability over all paths that the path has at least s least probable edges.
Thus we can apply Lemma 6.8.7 and get
Pr[B(Z j)+2C(Z j)≥ s−1]≥ Pr[A(Z j)+B(Z j)+C(Z j)≥ s] > 1−2−k/4
for s = min(k/8log(n/k),k/16).
By Lemma 6.8.10,













The main area for improvement to our constructions for total-entropy independent
sources is in getting more bits out for smaller min-entropies. For large source
lengths `, we can only extract when the min-entropy rate is at least (r`)−η for some
constant η. Our extractors based on our extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources
work for smaller min-entropy, but require that ` < 12 logr. It would be nice to get
extractors which worked for large source lengths and smaller min-entropy. We note
that the constant η in our construction is small. So even constructing an extractor
that works for min-entropy rate (r`)−1/2 for large `, roughly matching our extractor
for small `, would be very interesting. Nonconstructively we can even achieve arbi-
trarily long source lengths ` for even much smaller min-entropies k = Ω(`+ logr)
(see Theorem 3.3.4), so our current bounds fall well short of what is possible.
For small-space sources, even our best construction requires that the min-
entropy is at least n−η for some small constant η. This min-entropy requirement is
quite high, and unlike in other cases, we can’t even do anything for smaller min-
entropies. Thus the main area for future improvement is in decreasing the min-
entropy requirement for extracting from small space sources. Even if we could
extract fewer bits for smaller min-entropy it would still be a great improvement,
although ideally we would like to extract as close to k bits as possible.
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The other area for improvement is in the space requirement for our extrac-
tors. Non explicitly, we can get extractors for space even up to k, so we would like
to get as close to this bound as possible. For constant rate sources, our construc-
tions are within a constant factor of the non-explicit bound, but for sub-constant




7.1 Overview Of Our Results
Recall from Section 2.2 that affine sources are sources distributed uniformly over
a k dimensional affine subspace of {0,1}n. To extract from such sources, we use
functions known as bent functions [Rot76, Dil74]. These are boolean functions
which have maximum distance to any boolean affine function. They have previously
been studied primarily for their cryptographic properties. In Section 7.3, we show
that any bent function is also a 122
n/2−k-extractor for dimension k affine sources on
{0,1}n.
In Section 7.4, we show how to get more bits out. To do so, we use a gen-
eralization of bent functions to multiple output bits introduced by Nyberg [Nyb91],
which he calls “perfect non-linear” functions. Such functions consist of m bent
functions such that any non-zero linear combination of these functions is also bent.
Because each of these bent functions is also an extractor, we get a construction
of m functions such that any non-zero linear combination of these functions is a
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2n/2−k−1-extractor for dimension k affine sources on {0,1}n. Thus the output of
these functions on the source forms a 2n/2−k-biased space, and so using the relation
between ε-bias and closeness in variation distance [Vaz86, AGHP92], we get that
these perfect nonlinear functions are 2n/2−k+m/2-extractors with output length m for
dimension k affine sources on {0,1}n.
7.2 Preliminaries
Before we get to our results, we review some important definitions.





Definition 7.2.2. A bent function is a boolean function f : {0,1}n → {0,1} with
|F(u)|= 2n/2 for all u ∈ {0,1}n.
An equivalent characterization of bent functions is that they are the set of
boolean functions that have maximum distance to any affine function. That is,
for any boolean affine function u · x + a, Pr[ f (x) = u · x + a] = 1/2± 2−n/2. This
relationship between bent functions and affine functions is similar in spirit to our
results.
In particular, Maiorana (unpublished, see [Dil74]) and McFarland [McF73]
gave the following general method to construct bent functions.
Theorem 7.2.3. Let g : {0,1}n/2 → {0,1} be any function and π : {0,1}n/2 →
{0,1}n/2 be any permutation. Then the function f : {0,1}n = {0,1}n/2×{0,1}n/2→
{0,1} defined as
f (x1,x2) = π(x1) · x2 +g(x1)
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is a bent function.
In particular, if π is the identity permuation and g is the zero constant func-
tion, then we see that the function f (x1,x2) = x1 ·x2 is an extremely simple example
of a bent function.
We’ll also need the definition of an ε-biased random variable, which has the
property that every non-zero linear combination of its bits is close to uniform.
Definition 7.2.4. A random variable X over {0,1}m is ε-biased, if for all non-zero
a ∈ {0,1}m,
|Pr[a ·X = 0]−Pr[a ·X = 1]| ≤ ε.
Equivalently, a ·X is ε/2 close to uniform in variation distance.
Vazirani [Vaz86] showed that if X is ε-biased, then X is also close to uniform
(see also [AGHP92]).
Theorem 7.2.5. [Vaz86] If the random variable X over {0,1}m is ε-biased, then X
is 2m/2ε close to uniform in variation distance.
7.3 Extracting A Single Bit
The following theorem states that any bent function is a single bit extractor for
affine sources. In particular, any of the Maiorana-McFarland bent functions from
Theorem 7.2.3 is an extractor.
Theorem 7.3.1. Any bent function f : {0,1}n→{0,1} is an ε-extractor for dimen-
sion k affine sources on {0,1}n for ε = 2n/2−k−1.
The proof is a straightforward application of the following well known lemma
(see e.g. [Car02]).
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Lemma 7.3.2. Let f : {0,1}n→ {0,1} be a boolean function and E be any vector
subspace of {0,1}n and a ∈ {0,1}n. Then
∑
x∈a⊕E




Proof. (Of Theorem 7.3.1.) Let a⊕E be the affine space corresponding to the affine
source. Then the variation distance from uniform is given by
| Pr
x∈a⊕E




[ f (x) = 0]− Pr
x∈a⊕E
























where Lemma 7.3.2 is used in the third line.
7.4 Extracting Multiple Bits
Now we show how we can use the fact that any boolean bent function is an extractor
to get an extractor that outputs many bits. We use the results of Nyberg [Nyb91]
for constructing sets of bent functions such that any non-zero linear combination
of these functions is also bent, which he calls “perfect nonlinear”. Nyberg gives a
few different constructions. The one that we give here is based on the Maiorana-
McFarland method discussed in Section 7.2.
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Theorem 7.4.1. [Nyb91] Let n > 0 and m≤ n/2, and for 1≤ i≤m let fi : {0,1}n→
{0,1} be defined as
fi(x) = fi(x1,x2) = πi(x1) · x2 +gi(x1),
where πi is a permutation of {0,1}n/2 and gi is a function from {0,1}n/2 to {0,1}.
Then f : {0,1}n→{0,1}m defined as
f (x) = ( f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fm(x))
has the property that the function defined by taking any non-zero linear combination
of its output bits is also bent if and only if every non-zero linear combination of
the permutations πi is a permutation of {0,1}n/2. In particular, if for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
πi(x1) = αix1, where α is a primitive element of GF(2n/2), then f has the desired
property. (Note that in πi we implicitly map x1 from {0,1}n/2 to GF(2n/2) so we
can perform the multiplication by αi in this field. Then we map the result back into
{0,1}n/2 so we can perform the dot product multiplication in fi.)
Since any bent function is also an extractor for affine sources, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 7.4.2. For m ≤ n/2, we can construct a function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m
such that the function defined by taking any non-zero linear combination of its out-
put bits is an ε-extractor for dimension k affine sources on {0,1}n for ε = 2n/2−k−1.
Thus the output of f forms a 2n/2−k-biased space.
Proof. Let f be the function defined in Theorem 7.4.1. Since the function defined
by taking any non-zero linear combination of the output bits of f is bent, by Theo-
rem 7.3.1 this function is also an ε-extractor.
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Now using the fact that ε-bias implies closeness to uniform, we get the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 7.4.3. For m ≤ n/2, we can construct a function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m
that is a 2n/2−k+m/2-extractor for dimension k affine sources on {0,1}n.
Proof. Let f be the function defined in Theorem 7.4.1 and X be a dimension k
affine source on {0,1}n. By Theorem 7.4.2, every non-zero linear combination of
the output bits of f (X) is ε-close to uniform, for ε = 2n/2−k−1. Hence, f (X) is
2ε-biased, so by Theorem 7.2.5, f (X) is 2n/2−k+m/2-close to uniform.
7.5 Subsequent Work and Open Questions
Recently, Bourgain [Bou07] has improved upon our results by giving a construction
of extractors which work for k any constant fraction of n. However, as we saw in
Theorem 3.1.3, this is still far from what can be achieved nonconstructively, where
we can extract even when the entropy is logarithmic in n.
Besides improving these previous constructions, an interesting open area is
in generalizing affine sources. Perhaps the most obvious generalization in light
of our previous study of symbol sources is to have d-ary affine sources. In this
case the source is uniformly distributed over an affine subspace of Znd instead of
Zn2. Recently Gabizon and Raz [GR05] have constructed extractors which extract
almost all of the entropy from such sources when each input symbol is taken from
a large finite field. However, this still leaves a large gap of alphabet sizes for which
we don’t know how to extract. In particular, it would be interesting to construct
extractors for small constant d > 2. Another generalization would be to have each
bit be given by a low-degree multi-variate polynomial of the random bits instead of
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